Improved Masking for Tweakable Blockciphers with Applications to Authenticated Encryption by Granger, Robert et al.
Improved Masking for Tweakable Blockciphers
with Applications to Authenticated Encryption
Robert Granger1?, Philipp Jovanovic2, Bart Mennink3??, and Samuel Neves4
1 École polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne, Switzerland
robert.granger@epfl.ch
2 Faculty of Computer Science and Mathematics, University of Passau, Germany
jovanovic@fim.uni-passau.de
3 Dept. Electrical Engineering, ESAT/COSIC, KU Leuven, and iMinds, Belgium
bart.mennink@esat.kuleuven.be
4 CISUC, Dept. of Informatics Engineering, University of Coimbra, Portugal
sneves@dei.uc.pt
Abstract. A popular approach to tweakable blockcipher design is via
masking, where a certain primitive (a blockcipher or a permutation) is
preceded and followed by an easy-to-compute tweak-dependent mask.
In this work, we revisit the principle of masking. We do so alongside
the introduction of the tweakable Even-Mansour construction MEM. Its
masking function combines the advantages of word-oriented LFSR- and
powering-up-based methods. We show in particular how recent advance-
ments in computing discrete logarithms over finite fields of characteristic 2
can be exploited in a constructive way to realize highly efficient, constant-
time masking functions. If the masking satisfies a set of simple conditions,
then MEM is a secure tweakable blockcipher up to the birthday bound.
The strengths of MEM are exhibited by the design of fully paralleliz-
able authenticated encryption schemes OPP (nonce-respecting) and MRO
(misuse-resistant). If instantiated with a reduced-round BLAKE2b per-
mutation, OPP and MRO achieve speeds up to 0.55 and 1.06 cycles per
byte on the Intel Haswell microarchitecture, and are able to significantly
outperform their closest competitors.
Keywords. Tweakable Even-Mansour, masking, optimization, discrete
logarithms, authenticated encryption, BLAKE2.
1 Introduction
Authenticated encryption (AE) has faced significant attention in light of the ongo-
ing CAESAR competition [17]. An AE scheme aims to provide both confidentiality
and integrity of processed data. While the classical approach is predominantly
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blockcipher-based, where an underlying blockcipher is used to encrypt, novel
approaches start from a permutation and either rely on Sponge-based principles
or on the fact that the Even-Mansour construction E(K,M) = P (K ⊕M)⊕K
is a blockcipher.
Characteristic for the majority of blockcipher-based AE schemes is that
they rely on a tweakable blockcipher where changes in the tweak can be realized
efficiently. The most prominent example of this is the OCB2 mode which internally
uses the XEX tweakable blockcipher [71]:
XEX(K, (X, i0, i1, i2),M) = E(K, δ ⊕M)⊕ δ ,
where δ = 2i03i17i2E(K,X). The idea is that every associated data or message
block is transformed using a different tweak, where increasing i0, i1, or i2 can be
done efficiently. This approach is furthermore used in second-round CAESAR
candidates AEZ, COPA, ELmD, OTR, POET, and SHELL. Other approaches
to masking include Gray code ordering (used in OCB1 and OCB3 [72,58] and
OMD) and the word-oriented LFSR-based approach where δ = ϕi(E(K,X)) for
some LFSR ϕ (suggested by Chakraborty and Sarkar [20]).
The same masking techniques can also be used for permutation-based tweak-
able blockciphers. For instance, Minalpher uses the Tweakable Even-Mansour
(TEM) construction [75] with XEX-like masking, and similar for Prøst. This TEM
construction has faced generalizations by Cogliati et al. [26,27] and Mennink [65],
but none of them considers efficiency improvements of the masking.
1.1 Masked Even-Mansour (MEM) Tweakable Cipher
As a first contribution, we revisit the state of the art in masking with the
introduction of the “Masked Even-Mansour” tweakable blockcipher in Section 3.
At a high level, MEM is a Tweakable Even-Mansour construction, where the
masking combines ideas from both word-oriented LFSR- and powering-up-based
masking. As such, MEM combines “the best of both” masking approaches, leading
to significant improvements in simplicity, error-proneness, and efficiency.
In more detail, let P be a b-bit permutation. MEM’s encryption functions is
defined as
E˜(K,X, i¯,M) = P (δ(K,X, i¯)⊕M)⊕ δ(K,X, i¯) ,
where i¯ = (i0, . . . , iu−1) and where the masking function is of the form
δ(K,X, i¯) = ϕiu−1u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi00 (P (X ‖ K)) ,
for a certain set of LFSRs (ϕ0, . . . , ϕu−1). MEM’s decryption function D˜ is
specified analogously but using P−1 instead of P .
The tweak space and the list of LFSRs are clearly required to satisfy some
randomness condition. Indeed, if a distinguisher can choose a list of tweaks i¯
such that ϕiu−1u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi00 (L) for a uniformly random L offers no or limited
entropy, it can easily distinguish MEM from a random primitive. A similar case
applies if the distinguisher can make two different maskings collide with high
probability. Denote by  the minimal amount of entropy offered by the functions
ϕ
iu−1
u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi00 and ϕiu−1u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi00 ⊕ ϕ
i′u−1
u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi
′
0
0 for any two maskings i¯, i¯′
(see Definition 1 for the formal definition). Then, we prove that MEM is a secure
tweakable blockcipher in the ideal permutation model up to 4.5q
2+3qp
2 +
p
2k , where
q is the number of construction queries, p the number of primitive queries, and
k the key length. The security proof follows Patarin’s H-coefficient technique,
which has shown its use to Even-Mansour security proofs before in, among others,
[24,23,4,28,26,66].
To guarantee that the maskings offer enough randomness, it is of pivotal
importance to define a proper domain of the masking. At the least, the functions
ϕ
iu−1
u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi00 should be different for all possible choices of i¯, or more formally,
such that there do not exist i¯, i¯′ such that
ϕ
iu−1
u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi00 = ϕ
i′u−1
u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi
′
0
0 .
Guaranteeing this requires the computation of discrete logarithms. For small cases,
such as b = 64 and b = 128, we can inherit the computations from Rogaway for
XEX [71]. For instance, for b = 128, it is known that u = 3, (ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2) = (2,3,7),
and (i0, i1, i2) ∈ {−2108, . . . , 2108} × {−27, . . . , 27} × {−27, . . . , 27} does the job.
We extend the XEX approach to much larger block sizes by taking advantage
of the recent breakthroughs in the computation of discrete logs in small charac-
teristic fields, beginning with [33], followed by [48]. Computation of individual
discrete logarithms for the 1024-bit block used in our MEM instantiation takes
about 8hrs on a single core of a standard desktop computer, after an initial
precomputation, applicable to all logarithms, of 33.3hrs. Larger blocks are also
attainable, rendering workarounds such as subgroups [77] or different modes [74]
largely unnecessary.
Peculiarly, there have been uses of XEX for state sizes larger than b = 128
bits, even though it has been unclear what restrictions on the indices are due.
For instance, Prøst [53] defines a COPA and OTR instance for a 256- and 512-bit
blockcipher; both use maskings of the form 2i03i17i2 for i0 ranging between 0
and the maximal message length. For COPA, it has (i1, i2) ∈ {0, . . . , 5} × {0, 1}
and for OTR it has (i1, i2) ∈ {0, 1} × {0}. The security proof of Prøst never
formally computes conditions on the indices, and simply inherits the conditions
for b = 128. By computing the discrete logarithms in the respective fields—a
computationally easy task, demonstrated in Section 3.6—we can confirm that
the tweaks are unique for i0 ∈ {0, . . . , 2246 − 1} in the 256-bit block case, and
i0 ∈ {0, . . . , 2505 − 1} in the 512-bit block case.
1.2 Application to Nonce-Based AE
As first application, we present the Offset Public Permutation (OPP) mode in
Section 4, a parallelizable nonce-based AE based on MEM. It can be considered
as a permutation-based generalization of OCB3 [58] to arbitrary block sizes using
permutations and using the improved masking from MEM. Particularly, assuming
security of MEM, the proof of [58] mostly carries over, and we obtain that OPP
behaves like a random AE up to attack complexity dominated by min{2b/2, 2k}.
OPP also shows similarities with Kurosawa’s adaption of IAPM and OCB to the
permutation-based setting [59].
Using the masking techniques described later in this paper, OPP has excellent
performance when compared to contemporary permutation-based schemes, such
as first-round CAESAR [17] submissions Artemia, Ascon, CBEAM, ICEPOLE,
Keyak, NORX, pi-Cipher, PRIMATEs, and STRIBOB, SpongeWrap schemes in
general [11,66], and sp-AELM [1]. OPP improves upon these by being inherently
parallel and rate-1; the total overhead of the mode reduces to 2 extra permutation
calls and the aforementioned efficient masking.
In particular, when instantiated with a reduced-round BLAKE2b permutation
[6], OPP achieves a peak speed of 0.55 cycles per byte on an Intel Haswell processor
(see Section 8). This is faster than any other permutation-based CAESAR
submission. In fact, there are only a few CAESAR ciphers, such as Tiaoxin
(0.28 cpb) or AEGIS (0.35 cpb), which are faster than the above instantiation of
OPP. However, both require AES-NI to reach their best performance and neither
of them is arbitrarily parallelizable.
1.3 Application to Nonce-Misuse Resistant AE
We also consider permutation-based authenticated encryption schemes that are
resistant against nonce-reuse. We consider “full” nonce-misuse resistance, where
the output is completely random for different inputs, but we remark that similarly
schemes can be designed to achieve “online” nonce-misuse resistance [29,44], for
instance starting from COPA [3]. It is a well-known result that nonce-misuse
resistant schemes are inherently offline, meaning that two passes over the data
must be made in order to perform the authenticated encryption.
The first misuse-resistant AE we consider is the parallelizable Misuse-Resistant
Offset (MRO) mode (Section 5). It starts from OPP, but with the absorption
performed on the entire data and with encryption done in counter mode instead.5
As the underlying MEM is used by the absorption and encryption parts for
different maskings, we can view the absorption and encryption as two independent
functions and a classical MAC-then-Encrypt security proof shows that MRO is
secure up to complexity dominated by min{2b/2, 2k, 2t/2}.
Next, we consider Misuse-Resistant Sponge (MRS) in Section 6. It is not
directly based on MEM; it can merely be seen as a cascaded evaluation of the
Full-state Keyed Duplex of Mennink et al. [66], a generalization of the Duplex of
Bertoni et al. [11]: a first evaluation computes the tag on input of all data, the
second evaluation encrypts the message with the tag functioning as the nonce.
5 MRO’s structure is comparable with the independently introduced Synthetic Counter
in Tweak [46,47].
MRS is mostly presented to suit the introduction of the Misuse-Resistant Sponge-
Offset hybrid (MRSO) in Section 7, which absorbs like MRS and encrypts like
MRO. (It is also possible to consider the complementary Offset-Sponge hybrid,
but we see no potential applications of this construction.) The schemes MRS and
MRSO are proven secure up to complexity approximately min{2c/2, 2k/2, 2t/2}
and min{2(b−τ)/2, 2k, 2t/2}, respectively.
While various blockcipher-based fully misuse-resistant AE schemes exist (such
as SIV [73], GCM-SIV [40], HS1-SIV [57], AEZ [43], Deoxys= and Joltik= [46,47]
(using Synthetic Counter in Tweak mode), and DAEAD [21]), the state of the art
for permutation-based schemes is rather scarce. In particular, the only misuse-
resistant AE schemes known in literature are Haddoc and Mr. Monster Burrito
by Bertoni et al. [13]. Haddoc lacks a proper formalization but it appears to
be similar to MRSO, and the security and efficiency bounds mostly carry over.
Mr. Monster Burrito is a proof of concept to construct a permutation-based
robust AE comparable with AEZ [43], but it is four-pass and thus not very
practical.6
When instantiated with a reduced-round BLAKE2b permutation, MRO
achieves a peak speed of 1.06 cycles per byte on the Intel Haswell platform (see
Section 8). This puts MRO on the same level as AES-GCM-SIV [40] (1.17 cpb),
which, however, requires AES-NI to reach its best performance. We further
remark that MRO is also more efficient than MRSO, and thus the Haddoc mode.
2 Notation
We set N = {0, 1, . . .} and N+ = {1, 2, . . .}, and denote by F2n the finite field of
order 2n with n ≥ 1. A b-bit string X is an element of {0, 1}b or equivalently
of the F2-vector space Fb2. The length of a bit string X in bits is denoted by
|X| (= b) and in r-bit blocks by |X|r. For example, the size of X in bytes is
|X|8. The bit string of length 0 is identified with ε. The concatenation of two
bit strings X and Y is denoted by X ‖ Y . The encoding of an integer x as an
n-bit string is denoted by 〈x〉n. The symbols ¬, ∨, ∧, ⊕, , ,≪, and≫,
denote bit-wise NOT, OR, AND, XOR, left-shift, right-shift, left-rotation, and
right-rotation, respectively.
Given a b-bit string X = x0 ‖ · · · ‖ xb−1 we define leftl(X) = x0 ‖ · · · ‖ xl−1
to be the l left-most and rightr(X) = xb−r ‖ · · · ‖ xb−1 to be the r right-most
bits of X, respectively, where 1 ≤ l, r ≤ b. In particular, note that X = leftl(X) ‖
rightb−l(X) = leftb−r(X) ‖ rightr(X). We define the following mapping functions
which extend a given input string X to a multiple of the block size b and cut it
into chunks of b bits:
pad0b : {0, 1}∗ → ({0, 1}b)+, X 7→ X ‖ 0(b−|X|) mod b ,
6 We remark that the state of the art on online misuse-resistant permutation-based AE
is a bit more advanced. For instance, APE [2] is online misuse-resistant, and achieves
security against the release of unverified plaintext, but satisfies the undesirable
property of backwards decryption. Also Minalpher and Prøst-COPA are online
misuse-resistant.
pad10b : {0, 1}∗ → ({0, 1}b)+, X 7→ X ‖ 1 ‖ 0(b−|X|−1) mod b .
The set of all permutations of width b ∈ N bits is denoted by Perm(b). The
parameters k, n, τ ∈ N conventionally define the size of the key, nonce, and tag,
respectively, for which we require that n ≤ b− k − 1. In the context of Sponge
functions r ∈ N and c ∈ N denote rate and capacity such that b = r + c, and we
require k ≤ c.
When writing X $←− X for some finite set X , we mean that X gets sampled
uniformly at random from X .
2.1 Distinguishers
A distinguisher D is a computationally unbounded probabilistic algorithm. By
DO we denote the setting that D is given query access to an oracle O: it can
make queries to O adaptively, and after this, the distinguisher outputs 0 or 1. If
we consider two different oracles O and P with the same interface, we define the
distinguishing advantage of D by
∆D(O ; P) =
∣∣∣Pr(DO = 1)−Pr(DP = 1)∣∣∣ . (1)
Here, the probabilities are taken over the randomness from O and P. The
distinguisher is usually bounded by a limited set of resources, e.g., it is allowed
to make at most q queries to its oracle. We will use the definition of ∆ for
our formalization of the security (tweakable) blockciphers and authenticated
encryption. Later in the paper, ∆ will furthermore be used to measure the security
of PRFs, and others.
2.2 Tweakable Blockciphers
Let T be a set of “tweaks.” A tweakable blockcipher E˜ : {0, 1}k × T × {0, 1}b →
{0, 1}b is a function such that for every key K ∈ {0, 1}k and tweak T ∈ T ,
E˜(K,T, ·) is a permutation in Perm(b). We denote its inverse by E˜−1(K,T, ·).
Denote by P˜erm(T , b) the set of families of tweakable permutations pi such that
pi(T, ·) ∈ Perm(b) for every T ∈ T .
The conventional security definitions for tweakable blockciphers are tweakable
pseudorandom permutation (TPRP) security and strong TPRP (STPRP) security:
in the former, the distinguisher can only make forward construction queries, while
in the latter it is additionally allowed to make inverse construction queries. We
will consider a mixed security notion, where the distinguisher may only make
forward queries for a subset of tweaks. It is inspired by earlier definitions from
Rogaway [71] and Andreeva et al. [3].
Let P $←− Perm(b) be a b-bit permutation, and consider a tweakable blockcipher
E˜ based on permutation P . Consider a partition T0 ∪ T1 = T of the tweak space
into forward-only tweaks T0 and forward-and-inverse tweaks T1. We define the
mixed tweakable pseudorandom permutation (MTPRP) security of E˜ against a
distinguisher D as
Advm˜prp
E˜,P
(D) = ∆D(E˜±K , P± ; pi±, P±) , (2)
where the probabilities are taken over the random choices of K, pi, and P . The
distinguisher is not allowed to query E˜−1K for tweaks from T0. By Advm˜prpE˜,P (q, p)
we denote the maximum advantage over all distinguishers that make at most q
construction queries and at most p queries to P±.
Note that the definition of MTPRP matches TPRP if (T0, T1) = (T , ∅) and
STPRP if (T0, T1) = (∅, T ). It is a straightforward observation that if a tweakable
cipher E˜ is MTPRP for two sets (T0, T1), then it is MTPRP for (T0∪{T}, T1\{T})
for any T ∈ T1. Ultimately, this observation implies that an STPRP is a TPRP.
2.3 Authenticated Encryption
Let Π = (E ,D) be an authenticated encryption (AE) scheme which is keyed via
a secret key K ∈ {0, 1}k and operates as follows:
EK(N,H,M) = (C, T ) ,
DK(N,H,C, T ) = M/⊥ .
Here, N is the nonce, H the associated data, M the message, C the ciphertext,
and T the tag. In our analysis, we always have |M | = |C|, and we require that
DK(N,H, EK(N,H,M)) = M
for all N,H,M . By $E we define the idealized version of EK , which returns
(C, T ) $←− {0, 1}|M |+τ for every input. Finally, we denote by ⊥ a function that
returns ⊥ upon every query.
Our AE schemes are based on a b-bit permutation P , and we will analyze the
security of them in the setting where P is a random permutation: P $←− Perm(b).
Following, among others, Rogaway and Shrimpton [73], Namprempre et al. [68],
and Gueron and Lindell [40], we define the AE security ofΠ against a distinguisher
D as
AdvaeΠ,P (D) = ∆D(EK ,DK , P± ; $E ,⊥, P±) , (3)
where the probabilities are taken over the random choices of K, $E , and P . The
distinguisher is not allowed (i) to repeat any query and (ii) to relay the output
of EK to the input of DK . Note that we do not a priori require the distinguisher
to be nonce-respecting: depending on the setting, it may repeat nonces at its
own discretion. We will always explicitly mention whether we consider nonce-
respecting or nonce-reusing distinguishers. By AdvaeΠ,P (qE , qD, σ, p) we denote the
maximum advantage over all (nonce-respecting/reusing) distinguishers that make
at most qE queries to the encryption oracle and at most qD to the decryption
oracle, of total length at most σ padded blocks, and that make at most p queries
to P±.
3 Tweakable Even-Mansour with General Masking
We present the tweakable Even-Mansour construction MEM. Earlier appearances
of tweakable Even-Mansour constructions include Sasaki et al. [75], Cogliati et
al. [26], and Mennink [65], but these constructions target different settings, do
not easily capture the improved maskings as introduced below, and are therefore
not applicable in this work.
Our specification can be seen as a generalization of both the XE(X) con-
struction of Rogaway [71] and the tweakable blockcipher from Chakraborty and
Sarkar [20] to the permutation-based setting. While Rogaway limited himself to
128-bit fields, we realize our approach to fields well beyond the reach of Pohlig-
Hellman: historically the large block size would have been a severe obstruction,
as observed in works by Yasuda and Sarkar [77,74], and some schemes simply
ignored the issue [53]. The breakthroughs in computing discrete logarithms in
small characteristic fields [33,48,8,37] allow to easily pass the 128-bit barrier. In
particular, for blocks of 2n bits, it is eminently practical to compute discrete
logarithms for n ≤ 13. Further details of our solution of discrete logarithms over
F2512 and F21024 are described in Section 3.6.
3.1 Definition
Let b ∈ N+ and P ∈ Perm(b). In the following we specify MEM, a tweakable
Even-Mansour block cipher with general masking (E˜, D˜) where E˜ and D˜ denote
encryption and decryption functions, respectively. Let u ≥ 1, and let Φ =
{ϕ0, . . . , ϕu−1} be a set of functions ϕj : {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b. Consider a tweak
space T of the form
T ⊆ {0, 1}b−k × Nu (4)
and specify the general masking function δ : {0, 1}k × T → {0, 1}b as
δ : (K,X, i0, . . . , iu−1) 7→ ϕiu−1u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi00 (P (X ‖ K)) .
By convention, we set ϕijj = id for ij = 0, for each 0 ≤ j ≤ u− 1. For brevity of
notation we write i¯ = (i0, . . . , iu−1), and set
Ti¯ =
{
i¯ | ∃X such that (X, i¯) ∈ T } .
The encryption function E˜ : {0, 1}k × T × {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b is now defined as
E˜ : (K,X, i¯,M) 7→ P (δ(K,X, i¯)⊕M)⊕ δ(K,X, i¯) ,
where M denotes the to be encrypted message. The decryption function D˜ :
{0, 1}k × T × {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b is defined analogously as
D˜ : (K,X, i¯, C) 7→ P−1(δ(K,X, i¯)⊕ C)⊕ δ(K,X, i¯) ,
where C denotes the to be decrypted ciphertext. Note that the usual block cipher
property D˜(K,X, i¯, E˜(K,X, i¯,M)) = M is obviously satisfied. Throughout the
document, we will often use the following shorthand notation for E˜ i¯K,X(M) =
E˜(K,X, i¯,M), D˜i¯K,X(C) = D˜(K,X, i¯, C), and δi¯K,X = δ(K,X, i¯).
3.2 Security
Eq. (4) already reveals that we require some kind of restriction on T . Informally,
we require the masking functions ϕiu−1u−1 ◦· · ·◦ϕi00 to generate pairwise independent
values for different tweaks. More formally, we define proper tweak spaces in
Definition 1. This definition is related to earlier observations in Rogaway [71]
and Sarkar [74].
Definition 1. Let u ≥ 1 and Φ = {ϕ0, . . . , ϕu−1} be a set of functions. The
tweak space T is -proper relative to the function set Φ if the following two
properties are satisfied.
1. For any y ∈ {0, 1}b, (i0, . . . , iu−1) ∈ Ti¯, and uniformly random L $←− {0, 1}b:
Pr
[
ϕ
iu−1
u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi00 (L) = y
]
= 2− .
2. For any y ∈ {0, 1}b, distinct (i0, . . . , iu−1), (i′0, . . . , i′u−1) ∈ Ti¯, and uniformly
random L $←− {0, 1}b:
Pr
[
ϕ
iu−1
u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi00 (L)⊕ ϕ
i′u−1
u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi
′
0
0 (L) = y
]
= 2− .
We are now ready to prove the security of MEM.
Theorem 2. Let u ≥ 1 and Φ = {ϕ0, . . . , ϕu−1} be a set of functions. Let
P
$←− Perm(b). Assume that the tweak space T is -proper relative to Φ. Let
T0 ∪ T1 = T be a partition such that (0, . . . , 0) /∈ T1 i¯. Then,
Advm˜prp
E˜,P
(q, p) ≤ 4.5q
2
2 +
3qp
2 +
p
2k .
The proof is given in Supporting Material A. It is based on Patarin’s H-coefficient
technique [70,24], and borrows ideas from [71,20,74,65].
3.3 History of Masking
Many masking functions have been suggested since such schemes were invented.
IAPM [52] proposed the masking to be a subset sum of c encrypted blocks
derived from the nonce, where 2c is the maximum number of blocks a message
can have. In the same document Jutla also suggested masking the jth block
with (j + 1)K + IV mod p, for some prime p near the block size. XCBC [30]
used a similar masking function, but replaced arithmetic modulo p by arithmetic
modulo 2b, at the cost of some tightness in security reductions.
OCB [72,71,58] and PMAC [14] used the field F2b for their masking. There
are two different masking functions used in variants of OCB:
– The powering-up method of OCB2 [71] computes ϕi(L) = xi · L, where · is
multiplication in F2b , and x is a generator of the field.
– The Gray code masking of OCB1 [72] and OCB3 [58] computes ϕi(L) = γi ·L,
where γi = i ⊕ (i  1). This method requires a single XOR to compute
ϕi+1(L) given ϕi(L), provided a precomputation of log2 |M | multiples of L is
carried out in advance. Otherwise, up to log2 i field doublings are required to
obtain γi ·L. This Gray code trick was also applicable to IAPM’s subset-sum
masking.
Another family of masking functions, word-oriented LFSRs, was suggested by
Chakraborty and Sarkar [20]. Instead of working directly with the polynomial
representation F2[x]/f for some primitive polynomial f , word-oriented LFSRs
treat the block as the field F2wn , where w is the native word size. Thus, the
block can be represented as a polynomial of degree n over F2w , which makes the
arithmetic more software-friendly. A further generalized variant of this family of
generators is described (and rejected) in [58, Appendix B], who also attribute
the same technique to [78]. Instead of working with explicitly-constructed field
representations, one starts by trying to find a b× b matrix M ∈ GL(b,F2) that is
very efficient to compute. Then, if this matrix has a primitive minimal polynomial
of degree b, this transformation is in fact isomorphic to F2b and has desirable
masking properties. The masking function is then ϕi(L) = M i · L.
Although the above maximal-period matrix recursions have only recently
been suggested for use in efficient masking, the approach has been long stud-
ied by designers of non-cryptographic pseudorandom generators. For example,
Niederreiter [69, Section 4] proposed a pseudorandom generator design based on
a matrix recursion. Later methods, like the Mersenne Twister family [63] and the
Xorshift [62] generator, improved the efficiency significantly by cleverly choosing
the matrix shape to be CPU-friendly.
More recently, Minematsu [67] suggested a different approach to masking
based on data-dependent rotation. In particular,
ϕi(L) =
⊕
0≤j<b
{
(L≪ j) if bi/2jc mod 2 = 1 ,
0 otherwise .
where the block size b is prime. With Gray code ordering, one only needs one
rotation and XOR per sequential mask without storing previous masks. That
being said, the prime block size is inconvenient, and data-dependent rotation is
a relatively expensive operation compared to some of the previous techniques.
3.4 Proposed Masking for u = 1
We loosely follow the Xorshift [62] design approach for our masking procedure.
Let b = nw be the block size, interpreted as n words of w bits. We begin with
fast linear operations available in most current CPUs and encode them as w ×w
matrices. More precisely, we denote by 0 the all-zero matrix, by I the identity
matrix, by SHLc and SHRc matrices corresponding to left- and right-shift by
c bits, by ROTc the matrix realizing left-rotation by c bits, and by ANDc the
matrix corresponding to bit-wise AND with a constant c. Then, we construct
block matrices using those operations in a way that minimizes computational
effort. To maximize efficiency we consider b× b matrices over F2 of the form
M =

0 I · · · 0
...
... . . .
...
0 0 · · · I
X0 X1 · · · Xn−1
 (5)
with Xi ∈ {0, I,SHLc, SHRc, ROTc, ANDc} where dim(Xi) = w for 0 ≤ i ≤ n−1.
We favor matrices where only a minimal amount of Xi are nonzero. For a concrete
selection of X0, . . . , Xn−1 we check if the matrix order is maximal; if so, this
matrix is suitable for a masking function that respects the conditions listed above.
Testing candidate masks for maximal order may be efficiently performed with-
out any explicit matrix operations. Given a candidate linear map corresponding
to a matrix M of the form Eq. (5),
(x0, . . . , xn−1) 7→ (x1, . . . , xn−1, f(x0, . . . , xn−1)) ,
one can simply select x0, . . . , xn−1 at random, define xi+n = f(xi, . . . , xi+n−1),
and obtain the connection polynomial p(x) from the sequence of least significant
bits of x0, . . . , x2b using, e.g., Berlekamp-Massey. If p(x) is a primitive polynomial
of degree b, p(x) is also the minimal polynomial of the associated matrix M .
This approach yields a number of simple and efficient masking functions. In
particular, the 3-operation primitives (x0≪ r0)⊕ (xi  r1) and (x0≪ r0)⊕
(xi  r1) are found for several useful block and word sizes, as Table 1 illustrates.
Some block sizes do not yield such small generators with any primitive we tried; in
particular, 128-bit blocks require at least 4 operations, which is consistent—albeit
somewhat better—with the results of [58, Appendix B]. Lemma 3 shows that
this approach yields proper masking functions according to Definition 1.
Lemma 3. Let M be an b × b matrix over F2 of the form shown in Eq. (5).
Furthermore, let M ’s minimal polynomial be primitive and of degree b. Then
given the function ϕi0(L) = M i · L, any tweak set with Ti¯ ⊆ {0, . . . , 2b − 2} is a
b-proper tweak space by Definition 1.
Proof. [20, Proposition 1] directly applies.
One may wonder whether there is any significant advantage of the above
technique over, say, the Gray code sequence with the standard polynomial
representation. We argue that our approach improves on it in several ways:
Simplicity OCB (especially OCB2) requires implementers to be aware of Galois
field arithmetic. Our approach requires no user knowledge—even implicitly—
of field or polynomial arithmetic, but only unconditional shifts and XOR
operations. Even Sarkar’s word-based LFSRs [74] do not hide the finite field
structure from implementers, thus making it easier to make mistakes.
Table 1: Sample masking functions for various state sizes b and respective decom-
positions into n words of w bits
b w n ϕ
128 8 16 (x1, . . . , x15, (x0≪ 1)⊕ (x9  1)⊕ (x10  1))
128 32 4 (x1, . . . , x3, (x0≪ 1)⊕ (x1 ∧ 31)⊕ (x2 ∧ 127))
128 32 4 (x1, . . . , x3, (x0≪ 5)⊕ x1 ⊕ (x1  13))
128 64 2 (x1, (x0≪ 11)⊕ x1 ⊕ (x1  13))
256 32 8 (x1, . . . , x7, (x0≪ 17)⊕ x5 ⊕ (x5  13))
256 64 4 (x1, . . . , x3, (x0≪ 3)⊕ (x3  5))
512 32 16 (x1, . . . , x15, (x0≪ 5)⊕ (x3  7))
512 64 8 (x1, . . . , x7, (x0≪ 29)⊕ (x1  9))
800 32 25 (x1, . . . , x15, (x0≪ 25)⊕ x21 ⊕ (x21  13))
1024 8 128 (x1, . . . , x127, (x0≪ 1)⊕ x125 ⊕ (x125  5))
1024 64 16 (x1, . . . , x15, (x0≪ 53)⊕ (x5  13))
1600 32 50 (x1, . . . , x49, (x0≪ 3)⊕ (x23  3))
1600 64 25 (x1, . . . , x24, (x0≪ 55)⊕ x21 ⊕ (x21  21))
1600 64 25 (x1, . . . , x24, (x0≪ 15)⊕ x23 ⊕ (x23  23))
Constant-time Both OCB masking schemes require potentially variable-time
operations to compute each mask—be it conditional XOR, number of trailing
zeroes, or memory accesses indexed by ntz(i+ 1). This is easily avoidable by
clever implementers, but it is also a pitfall avoidable by our design choice.
Even in specifications aimed at developers [56], double(S) is defined as a
variable-time operation.
Efficiency Word-based masking has the best space-time efficiency tradeoff of
all considered masking schemes. It requires only minimal space usage—one
block—while also involving a very small number of operations beyond the
XOR with the block (as low as 3, cf. Table 1). It is also SIMD-friendly,
allowing the generation of several consecutive masks with a single short
SIMD instruction sequence.
In particular, for permutations that can take advantage of a CPU’s vector units
via “word-slicing”—which is the case for Salsa20, ChaCha, Threefish, and many
other ARX designs—it is possible to compute a few consecutive masks at virtually
the same cost as computing a single mask transition. It is also efficient, with our
masking, to add the mask to the plaintext both in transposed order (word-sliced)
and regular order.
For concreteness, consider the mask sequence (x1, . . . , x15, (x0≪ 5)⊕ (x3 
7)) and a permutation using 512-bit blocks of 32-bit words. Suppose further that
we are working with a CPU with 8-wide vectors, e.g., AVX2. Given 8 additional
words of storage, it is possible to compute L = (x1, . . . , x15, (x0≪ 5)⊕ (x3 
7), . . . , (x7≪ 5)⊕ (x10  7)) entirely in parallel. Consider now the transposed
set of 8 blocksm0, . . . ,m7; adding the mask consists ofm0⊕L0–15,m1⊕L1–16, . . . .
On the other hand, when the blocks are word-sliced—with m′0 being the first
32-bit word of mi, m′1 being the second, and so on—adding the mask is still
efficient, as m′0⊕L0–7,m′1⊕L1–8, . . . . This would be impossible with the standard
masking schemes used in, e.g., OCB.
There is also an advantage at the low-end—ϕ can easily be implemented as a
circular array, which implies that only an index and the logical operations must
be executed for each mask update. This is superior to both the typical Gray code
and powering-up approach, in that shifting by one requires moving every word of
the mask, instead of only one of them. Additionally, storage is often a precious
resource in low-end systems, and the Gray code method requires significantly
more than one block to achieve its best performance.
3.5 Proposed Masking for u = 2 and u = 3
Modes often require the tweak space to have multiple dimensions. In particular,
the modes of Sections 4 and 5 require the tweak space to have 2 and 3 “coordinates.”
To extend the masking function from Section 3.4 to a tweak space divided into
disjunct sets, we have several options. We can simply split the range [0, 2b − 1]
into equivalence classes, e.g., i0 = 4k + 0, i1 = 4k + 1, . . . for at most 4 different
tweak indexes. Some constructions instead store a few fixed tweak values that
are used later as “extra” finalization tweaks.
The approach we follow takes a cue from XEX [71]. Before introducing
the scheme itself, we need a deeper understanding of the masking function ϕ
introduced in Section 3.4. At its core, ϕ is a linear map representable by a
matrix M with primitive minimal polynomial p(x). In fact, ϕ can be interpreted
as the matrix representation [61, §2.52] of F2b , where M is, up to a change of
basis, the companion matrix of p(x). This property may be exploited to quickly
jump ahead to an arbitrary state ϕi(L): since ϕi(L) = M i · L and additionally
p(M) = 0, then (xi mod p(x))(M) = (xi)(M) + (p(x)q(x))(M) = (xi)(M) = M i.
Therefore we can implement arbitrarily large “jumps” in the tweak space by
evaluating the right polynomials over M . This property—like fast word-oriented
shift registers—has had its first uses in the pseudorandom number generation
literature [42].
Since we may control the polynomials here, we choose the very same poly-
nomials as Rogaway for the best performance: x+ 1, and x2 + x+ 1, denoted
in [71] as 3 and 7. Putting everything together, our masking for u = 3 becomes
δ(K,X, i0, i1, i2) = ((x)(M))i0((x+ 1)(M))i1((x2 + x+ 1)(M))i2 · P (K ‖ X)
= M i0(M + I)i1(M2 +M + I)i2 · P (K ‖ X) .
To ensure that the tweak space is b-proper we need one extra detail: we need
to ensure that the logarithms logx(x+ 1) and logx(x2 + x+ 1) are sufficiently
apart. While for 128, Rogaway has already computed the corresponding discrete
logarithms [71] using generic methods, larger blocks make it nontrivial to show
b-properness. The following lemma shows that one particular function satisfies
Definition 1. The lemma uses the discrete logarithms whose computation is
described in Section 3.6.
Lemma 4. Let ϕ(x) : {0, 1}1024 7→ {0, 1}1024 be the linear map (x0, . . . , x15) 7→
(x1, . . . , x15, (x0≪ 53)⊕ (x5  13)). Further, let M be the 1024× 1024 matrix
associated with ϕ such that ϕ(L) = M · L. Let Φ = {ϕi00 , ϕi11 , ϕi22 } be the set of
functions used in the masking, with ϕi00 (L) = M i0 · L, ϕi11 (L) = (M + I)i1 · L,
and ϕi22 (L) = (M2 +M + I)i2 · L. The tweak space
T = T0 × T1 × T2 = {0, 1, . . . , 21020 − 1} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1}
is b-proper relative to the function set Φ.
Proof. The proof closely follows [71, Proposition 5]. Let i0 ∈ T0, i1 ∈ T1, and
i2 ∈ T2. We first show that ϕi00 ◦ ϕi11 ◦ ϕi22 is unique for any distinct set of tweaks.
An easy computation shows that p(x) = x1024 + x901 + x695 + x572 + x409 +
x366 + x203 + x163 + 1 is the minimal polynomial of M . This polynomial is both
irreducible and primitive, which implies that the order ofM is 21024−1. We begin
by determining the logarithms of M + I and M2 +M + I relatively to M . This
may be accomplished by computing l1 = logx(x+ 1) and l2 = logx(x2 + x+ 1) in
the field F2[x]/p(x), see Section 3.6.
The values l1 and l2 let us represent M i0M i1M i2 as M i0M l1i1M l2i2 . Given
a second distinct pair (i′0, i′1, i′2), we have that M i0M l1i1M l2i2 = M i
′
0M l1i
′
1M l2i
′
2
iff i0 + l1i1 + l2i2 = i′0 + l1i′1 + l2i′2 (mod 21024 − 1). Equivalently, i0 − i′0 =
(i1− i′1)l1 +(i2− i′2)l2 (mod 21024−1). By a simple exhaustive search through the
valid ranges of i1 and i2 we are able to see that the smallest absolute difference
(i1−i′1)l1 +(i2−i′2)l2 occurs when i1−i′1 = −1 and i2−i′2 = −1, and is ≈ 21020.58.
Since i0 − i′0 is at most ±(21020 − 1), collisions cannot happen. Since each mask
is unique, the fact that T is b-proper follows from Lemma 3. uunionsq
3.6 Computing Discrete Logarithms in F2512 and F21024
While the classical incarnation of the Function Field Sieve (FFS) with F2 as
the base field could no doubt solve logarithms in F2512 with relatively modest
computational resources—see for example [49,76]—the larger field would require
a significant amount of work [7]. One could instead use subfields other than F2
and apply the medium-base-field method of Joux and Lercier [50], which would
be relatively quick for F2512 , but not so easy for F21024 .
However, with the advent of the more sophisticated modern incarnation
of the FFS, development of which began in early 2013 [33,48,34,8,35,36,51,37],
the target fields are now regarded as small, even tiny, at least relative to the
largest such example computation where a DLP in F29234 was solved [38]. Since
these developments have effectively rendered small characteristic DLPs useless for
public key cryptography, (despite perhaps some potential doubters [19, Section 5])
it is edifying that there is a constructive application in cryptography7 for what
is generally regarded as a purely cryptanalytic pursuit.
Due to the many subfields present in the fields in question, there is a large pa-
rameter space to explore with regard to the application of the modern techniques,
7 Beyond cryptography, examples abound in computational mathematics: in finite
geometry; representation theory; matrix problems; group theory; and Lie algebras in
the modular case; to name but a few.
and it becomes an interesting optimization exercise to find the most efficient
approach. Moreover, such is the size of these fields that coding time rather than
computing time is the dominant term in the overall cost. We therefore solved the
relevant DLPs using MAGMA V2.19-1 [16], which allowed us to develop rapidly.
All computations were executed on a standard desktop computer with a 2.0GHz
AMD Opteron processor.
3.6.1 Fields Setup. For reasons of both efficiency and convenience we use
F216 as base field for both target fields, given by the following extensions:
F24 = F2[U ]/(U4 + U + 1) = F2(u) ,
F216 = F24 [V ]/(V 4 + V 3 + V + u) = F24(v) .
We represent F2512 as F216 [X]/(I32(X)) = F216(x), where I32 is the degree 32
irreducible factor of H32(X) = h1(X16)X+h0(X16), where h1 = (X+u9 +u5v+
u13v2 + u3v3)3 and h0 = X3 + u2 + u9v2 + u13v3. The other irreducible factors
of H32(X) have degrees 6 and 11.
We represent F21024 as F216 [X]/(I64(X)) = F216(x), where I64 is the degree 64
irreducible factor of H64(X) = h1(X16)X + h0(X16), where h1 = (X + u+ u7v+
u4v2 + u7c3)5 and h0 = X5 + u9 + u4v+ u6v2 + v3. The other irreducible factors
of H64(X) have degrees 7 and 10. Transforming from the original representations
of Section 3.6.3 to these is a simple matter [60].
Note that ideally one would only have to use hi’s of degree 2 and 4 to obtain
degree 32 and 64 irreducibles, respectively. However, no such hi’s exist and so we
are forced to use hi’s of degree 3 and 5. The penalty for doing so incurs during
the relation generation, see Section 3.6.2, and during the descent, in particular
for degree 2 elimination, see Section 3.6.3.
Remark. The degrees of the irreducible cofactors of I32 in H32 and of I64 in H64 is
an essential consideration in the set up of the two fields. In particular, if the degree
df of a cofactor f has a non-trivial GCD with the degree of the main irreducible,
then it should be considered as a ‘trap’ for the computation of the logarithms of
the factor base elements, modulo all primes dividing 216·gcd(df ,32i)− 1 for i = 1, 2,
for F2512 and F21024 , respectively [45,25]. This is because F216 [X]/(H32i(X)) will
contain another copy of F216·gcd(df ,32i) which arises from f , and hence the solution
space modulo primes dividing 216·gcd(df ,32i) − 1 has rank > 1. Our choice of h0
and h1 in each case limits the effect of this problem to prime factors of 232 − 1,
namely subgroups of tiny order within which we solve the DLPs using a linear
search. The irreducible cofactors are also traps for the descent phase [35], but
are easily avoided.
3.6.2 Relation Generation and Logarithms of Linear Elements. The
factor base is defined to be F = {x+ d | d ∈ F216}. To generate relations over F ,
we use the technique from [33], described most simply in [35]. In particular, for
both target fields let y = x16; by the definitions of I32 and I64 it follows in both
cases that x = h0(y)/h1(y). Using these field isomorphisms, for any a, b, c ∈ F216
we have the field equality
x17 + ax16 + bx+ c = 1
h1(y)
(yh0(y) + ayh1(y) + bh0(y) + ch1(y)) . (6)
One can easily generate (a, b, c) triples such that the left hand side of Eq. (6)
always splits completely over F . Indeed, one first computes the set B of 16 values
B ∈ F216 such that the polynomial fB(X) = X17 + BX + B splits completely
over F216 [15]. Assuming c 6= ab and b 6= a16, the left hand side of Eq. (6) can
be transformed (up to a scalar factor) into fB, where B = (b+a
16)17
(c+ab)16 . Hence if
this B is in B then the left hand side also splits. In order to generate relations,
one repeatedly chooses random B ∈ B and random a, b 6= a16 ∈ F216 , computes
c = ((b+ a16)17)1/16 + ab, and tests whether the right hand side of Eq. (6) also
splits over F216 . If it does then one has a relation, since (y + d) = (x+ d1/16)16,
and each h1 is a power of a factor base element.
The probability that the right hand side of Eq. (6) splits completely is
heuristically 1/4! and 1/6! for F2512 and F21024 respectively. In both cases we
obtain 216 + 200 relations, which took about 0.3hrs and 8.8hrs, respectively.
To compute the logarithms of the factor base elements, we used MAGMA’s
ModularSolution function, with its Lanczos option set, modulo the 9th to 13th
largest prime factors of 2512− 1 for the smaller field and modulo the 10th to 16th
largest prime factors of 21024 − 1 for the larger field. These took about 13.5hrs
and 24.5 hrs, respectively.
3.6.3 Individual Logarithms. The original representations of the target
fields are:
F2512 = F2[T ]/(T 512 + T 335 + T 201 + T 67 + 1) = F2(t) ,
F21024 = F2[T ]/(T 1024 + T 901 + T 695 + T 572 + T 409 + T 366 + T 203 + T 163 + 1)
= F2(t) .
In order to solve the two relevant DLPs in each original field, we need to
compute three logarithms in each of our preferred field representations, namely
the logarithms of the images of t, t+ 1 and t2 + t+ 1—which we denote by t0, t1
and t2—relative to some generator. We use the generator x in both cases.
For F2512 , we multiply the targets ti by random powers of x and apply a
continued fraction initial split so that xkti ≡ n/d (mod I32), with n of degree
16 and d of degree 15, until both n and d are 4-smooth. One then just needs to
eliminate irreducible elements of degree 2, 3, 4 into elements of smaller degree.
For degree 4 elements, we apply the building block for the quasi-polynomial
algorithm due to Granger, Kleinjung, and Zumbrägel [36,37], which is just degree
2 elimination but over a degree 2 extended base field. This results in each degree
4 element being expressed as a product of powers of at most 19 degree 2 elements,
and possibly some linear elements. For degree 3 elimination we use Joux’s bilinear
quadratic system approach [48], which expresses each degree 3 element as a
product of powers of again at most 19 degree 2 elements and at least one linear
element. For degree 2 elimination, we use the on-the-fly technique from [33],
but with the quadratic system approach from [34], which works for an expected
proportion 1− (1− 1/2!)16 = 255/256 of degree 2’s, since the cofactor in each
case has degree 2. On average each descent takes about 10 s, and if it fails due to
a degree 2 being ineliminable, we simply rerun it with a different random seed.
Computing logarithms modulo the remaining primes only takes a few seconds
with a linear search, which completes the following results:
logt(t+ 1) = 5016323028665706705636609709550289619036901979668873
4872643788516514405882411611155920582686309266723854
51223577928705426532802261055149398490181820929802 ,
logt(t2 + t+ 1) = 7789795054597035122960933502653082209865724780784381
2166626513019333878034142500477941950081303675633401
11859664658120077665654853201902548299365773789462 .
The total computation time for these logarithms is less than 14 hrs.
For F21024 , we use the same continued fraction initial split, but now with n
and d of degree 32 and 31, until each is 4-smooth, but also allowing a number
of degree 8 elements. Finding such an expression takes on average 7hrs, which,
while not optimal, means that the classical special-Q elimination method could
be obviated, i.e., not coded. For degree 8 elimination, we again use the building
block for the quasi-polynomial algorithm of Granger et al., which expresses such
a degree 8 element as a product of powers of at most 21 degree 4 elements, and
possibly some degree 2 and 1 elements. Degree 4 and 3 elimination proceed as
before, but with a larger cofactor of the element to be eliminated on the r.h.s.
due to the larger degrees of h0 and h1. Degree 2 elimination is significantly
harder in this case, since the larger degrees of the hi’s mean that the elimination
probability for a random degree 2 element was only 1 − (1 − 1/4!)16 ≈ 0.494.
However, using the recursive method from the DLP computation in F24404 [35]
allows this to be performed with near certainty. If any of the eliminations fails,
then as before we simply rerun the eliminations with a different random seed. In
total, after the initial rewrite of the target elements into a product of degree 1, 2,
3, 4, and 8 elements, each descent takes just under an hour. Again, computing
logarithms modulo the remaining primes takes less than a minute with a linear
search, completing the following results:
logt(t+ 1) = 3560313810702380168941895068061768846768652879916524
2796753456565509842707655755413753100620979021885720
1966785351480307697311709456831372018598499174441196
1470332602216161583378362583657570756631024935927984
2498272238699528576230685242805763938951155448167387
149681903876406067502645471152193264955124750148 ,
logt(t2 + t+ 1) = 1610056439189028793452144461315558447020117376432642
5524859486238161374654279717800300706136749607630601
4967362673777547140089938700144112424081388711871290
7973319251629628361398267351880948069161459793052257
1907117948291164323355528169854354396482029507781947
2534171313076937775797909159788879361876099888834 .
The total computation time for these logarithms is about 57hrs.
Note that it is possible to avoid the computations in F2512 altogether by
embedding the relevant DLPs into F21024 . However, the descent time would take
longer than the total time, at least with the non-optimal descent that we used.
We considered the possibility of using “jokers” [35], which permit one to halve
the degree of even degree irreducibles when they are elements of a subfield of
index 2. However, it seems to only be possible when one uses compositums, which
is not possible in the context of the fields F22n . In any case, such optimizations
are academic when the total computation time is as modest as those recorded
here, and our approach has the bonus of demonstrating the easiness of computing
logarithms in F2512 , as well as in F21024 .
With regard to larger n, it would certainly be possible to extend the approach
of Kleinjung [55] to solve logarithms in the fields F22n for n = 11, 12 and 13,
should this be needed for applications, without too much additional computational
effort.
4 Offset Public Permutation Mode (OPP)
We present the Offset Public Permutation Mode (OPP), a nonce-respecting
authenticated encryption mode with support for associated data which uses
the techniques presented in Section 3. It can be seen as a generalization of
OCB3 [58] to arbitrary block sizes using permutations and using improved
masking techniques from Section 3.
4.1 Specification of OPP
OPP uses MEM of Section 3.1 for u = 3 and Φ = {α, β, γ} with α(x) = ϕ(x),
β(x) = ϕ(x) ⊕ x and γ(x) = ϕ(x)2 ⊕ ϕ(x) ⊕ x, employing ϕ as introduced in
Section 3.4. Furthermore, the general masking function is specified as
δ : (K,X, i0, i1, i2) 7→ γi2 ◦ βi1 ◦ αi0(P (X ‖ K)) .
We require that the tweak space of MEM used in OPP is b-proper with respect
to Φ as introduced in Definition 1 and proven in Lemma 4.
The formal specification of OPP is given in Fig. 1 and an overview of the
scheme is depicted in Fig. 2. We refer to the authentication part of OPP as
OPPAbs and to the encryption part as OPPEnc. The OPPAbs mode requires only
the encryption function E˜, while the OPPEnc mode uses both E˜ and D˜ of MEM.
Let Hi and Mj denote b-bit header and message blocks with 0 ≤ i ≤ h− 1
and 0 ≤ j ≤ m − 1 where h = |H|b and m = |M |b. Note that the size of the
last blocks Hh−1 and Mm−1 is potentially smaller than b bits. To realize proper
domain separation between full and partial data blocks, and different data types,
OPP uses the following setup:
OPPAbs OPPEnc
data block condition (i0, i1, i2) data block condition (i0, i1, i2)
Hi 0 ≤ i < h− 1 (i , 0, 0) Mj 0 ≤ j < m− 1 (j , 0, 1)
Hh−1 |H| mod b = 0 (h− 1, 0, 0) Mm−1 |M | mod b = 0 (m− 1, 0, 1)
Hh−1 |H| mod b 6= 0 (h− 1, 1, 0) Mm−1 |M | mod b 6= 0 (m− 1, 1, 1)⊕m−1
j=0
Mj |M | mod b = 0 (h− 1, 2, 0)⊕m−1
j=0
Mj |M | mod b 6= 0 (h− 1, 3, 0)
Algorithm: OPPEnc(K,X,M)
1. M0 ‖ · · · ‖Mm−1 ←M, s.t. |Mi| = b, 0 ≤ |Mm−1| < b
2. C ← ε
3. S ← 0b
4. for i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 2} do
5. Ci ← E˜i,0,1K,X (Mi)
6. C ← C ‖ Ci
7. S ← S ⊕Mi
8. end
9. if |Mm−1| > 0 then
10. Z ← E˜m−1,1,1K,X (0)
11. Cm−1 ← left|Mm−1|(pad0b(Mm−1)⊕ Z)
12. C ← C ‖ Cm−1
13. S ← S ⊕ pad10b (Mm−1)
14. end
15. return C, S
Algorithm: OPPAbs(K,X,H, S, l)
1. H0 ‖ · · · ‖ Hh−1 ← H, s.t. |Hi| = b, 0 ≤ |Hh−1| < b
2. S′ ← 0b
3. for i ∈ {0, . . . , h− 2} do
4. S′ ← S′ ⊕ E˜i,0,0K,X (Hi)
5. end
6. if |Hh−1| > 0 then
7. S′ ← S′ ⊕ E˜h−1,1,0K,X (pad10b (Hh−1))
8. end
9. j ← dl/be+ 2
10. return leftτ (S′ ⊕ E˜h−1,j,0K,X (S))
Algorithm: OPPDec(K,X,C)
1. C0 ‖ · · · ‖ Cm−1 ← C, s.t. |Ci| = b, 0 ≤ |Cm−1| < b
2. M ← ε
3. S ← 0b
4. for i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 2} do
5. Mi ← D˜i,0,1K,X(Ci)
6. M ←M ‖Mi
7. S ← S ⊕Mi
8. end
9. if |Cm−1| > 0 then
10. Z ← E˜m−1,1,1K,X (0)
11. Mm−1 ← left|Cm−1|(pad0b(Cm−1)⊕ Z)
12. M ←M ‖Mm−1
13. S ← S ⊕ pad10b (Mm−1)
14. end
15. return M,S
Algorithm: OPPE(K,N,H,M)
1. X ← pad0b−n−k(N)
2. C, S ← OPPEnc(K,X,M)
3. T ← OPPAbs(K,X,H, S, |M | mod b)
4. return C, T
Algorithm: OPPD(K,N,H,C, T )
1. X ← pad0b−n−k(N)
2. M,S ← OPPDec(K,X,C)
3. T ′ ← OPPAbs(K,X,H, S, |M | mod b)
4. if T = T ′ then return M else return ⊥ end
Fig. 1: Offset Public Permutation Mode (OPP)
4.2 Security of OPP
Theorem 5. Let P $←− Perm(b). Then, in the nonce-respecting setting,
AdvaeOPP,P (qE , qD, σ, p) ≤
4.5σ2
2b +
3σp
2b +
p
2k +
2n−τ
2n − 1 .
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Fig. 2: Offset Public Permutation Mode (OPP)
The proof is given in Supporting Material B. Note that OPP shares its structure
with OCB3 of Krovetz and Rogaway [58]. In more detail, we will show that once
MEM gets replaced by a random tweakable permutation pi, OPP becomes exactly
the ΘCB3 construction [58]. The proof then follows by combining the security of
MEM and the security of ΘCB3.
5 Misuse-Resistant Offset Mode (MRO)
We present the Misuse-Resistant Offset Mode (MRO), a MAC-then-Encrypt
AE mode with support for associated data which fully tolerates nonce re-usage.
In some sense, MRO is the misuse-resistant variant of OPP and also uses the
techniques presented in Section 3. It can be seen as a permutation-based variation
of PMAC [14] followed by a permutation-based variation of CTR mode, and
shares ideas with the Synthetic Counter in Tweak (SCT) as introduced in Deoxys
v1.3 and Joltik v1.3 [46,47], though MRO is permutation-based and employs the
improved masking schedule of Section 3.
5.1 Specification of MRO
The formal specification of MRO is given in Fig. 3 and an overview of the scheme
is depicted in Fig. 4. Similar to OPP, we refer to the authentication part of MRO
as MROAbs and to the encryption part as MROEnc. In contrast to OPP, MRO
only requires the encryption function E˜ of MEM. Using notation as in the OPP
mode, MRO uses the following setup for masking:
MROAbs MROEnc
data block condition (i0, i1, i2) data block condition (i0, i1, i2)
Hi 0 ≤ i ≤ h− 1 (i, 0, 0) Mj 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1 (0, 0, 1)
Mj 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1 (j, 1, 0)
|H| ‖ |M | n.a. (0, 2, 0)
Algorithm: Absorb(K,X, S,A, j)
1. if |A| > 0 then
2. A0 ‖ · · · ‖ Aa−1 ← pad0b(A)
3. for i ∈ {0, . . . , a− 1} do
4. S ← S ⊕ E˜i,j,0K,X(Ai)
5. end
6. end
7. return S
Algorithm: MROEnc(K,X, T,M)
1. C ← ε
2. if |M | > 0 then
3. M0 ‖ · · · ‖Mm−1 ← pad0b(M)
4. for i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1} do
5. Ci ←Mi ⊕ E˜0,0,1K,X (T ‖ i)
6. C ← C ‖ Ci
7. end
8. end
9. return left|M|(C)
Algorithm: MROE(K,N,H,M)
1. X ← pad0b−n−k(N)
2. T ← MROAbs(K,X,H,M)
3. C ← MROEnc(K,X, T,M)
4. return C, T
Algorithm: MROAbs(K,X,H,M)
1. S ← 0b
2. S ← Absorb(K,X, S,H, 0)
3. S ← Absorb(K,X, S,M, 1)
4. S ← E˜0,2,0K,X (S ⊕ |H| ‖ |M |)
5. return leftτ (S)
Algorithm: MRODec(K,X, T,C)
1. M ← ε
2. if |C| > 0 then
3. C0 ‖ · · · ‖ Cm−1 ← pad0b(C)
4. for i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1} do
5. Mi ← Ci ⊕ E˜0,0,1K,X (T ‖ i)
6. M ←M ‖Mi
7. end
8. end
9. return left|C|(M)
Algorithm: MROD(K,N,H,C, T )
1. X ← pad0b−n−k(N)
2. M ← MRODec(K,X, T,C)
3. T ′ ← MROAbs(K,X,H,M)
4. if T = T ′ then return M else return ⊥ end
Fig. 3: Misuse-Resistant Offset Mode (MRO)
5.2 Security of MRO
Theorem 6. Let P $←− Perm(b). Then, in the nonce-reuse setting,
AdvaeMRO,P (qE , qD, σ, p) ≤
6.5σ2
2b +
3σp
2b +
p
2k +
q2E/2 + qD
2τ .
The proof is given in Supporting Material C. The proof is in fact a standard-model
proof where the scheme is considered to be based on MEM. It is a modular proof
that, at a high level, consists of the following steps:
(i) The first step in the analysis is to replace MEM with a random secret
tweakable permutation, at the cost of the MTPRP security of MEM.
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Fig. 4: Misuse-Resistant Offset Mode (MRO)
(ii) The absorption function and encryption function call the tweakable cipher
for distinct tweaks. Hence, using an adaption of the MAC-then-Encrypt
paradigm to misuse resistance [68,40] allows us to analyze the MAC parts
and the encryption parts separately.
6 Misuse-Resistant Sponge (MRS)
We introduce the Misuse-Resistant Sponge Mode (MRS), a MAC-then-Encrypt
Sponge-based AE mode with support for associated data which fully tolerates
nonce re-usage. The absorption function is a full-state keyed Sponge MAC
[12,4,66]. The encryption function follows the SpongeWrap approach [11,66].
6.1 Specification of MRS
The formal specification of MRS is given in Fig. 5 and an overview of the scheme
is depicted in Fig. 6. It consists of an absorption function MRSAbs and an
encryption function MRSEnc, in a MAC-then-Encrypt mode, but using the same
primitive and same key in both functions. We remark that MRS as given in Fig. 5
only does one round of squeezing in order to obtain the tag. This can be easily
generalized to multiple rounds, without affecting the security proofs.
We briefly discuss the differences of MRS with Haddoc, the misuse-resistant
AE scheme presented by Bertoni et al. [13] at the 2014 SHA-3 workshop. Haddoc
follows the MAC-then-Encrypt paradigm as well, where the MAC function is
identical to MRSAbs. For encryption, however, Haddoc uses the Sponge in CTR
mode. At a high level, and in our terminology, this boils down to
Ci ←Mi ⊕ leftr(P (T ‖ 〈i〉 ‖ 1 ‖ K)) ,
for 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1. In other words, MRS and Haddoc structurally differ in the
way encryption is performed, and in fact, Haddoc more closely matches the ideas
of the MRSO hybrid of Section 7.
Algorithm: Absorb(S,A)
1. if |A| > 0 then
2. A0 ‖ · · · ‖ Aa−1 ← pad0b(A)
3. for i ∈ {0, . . . , a− 1} do
4. S ← P (S)
5. S ← S ⊕Ai
6. end
7. end
8. return S
Algorithm: MRSEnc(K,T,M)
1. C ← ε
2. if |M | > 0 then
3. S ← T ‖ 0∗ ‖ 1 ‖ K
4. M0 ‖ · · · ‖Mm−1 ← pad0r(M)
5. for i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1} do
6. S ← P (S)
7. S ← S ⊕ (Mi ‖ 0c)
8. C ← C ‖ leftr(S)
9. end
10. end
11. return left|M|(C)
Algorithm: MRSE(K,N,H,M)
1. T ← MRSAbs(K,N,H,M)
2. C ← MRSEnc(K,T,M)
3. return C, T
Algorithm: MRSAbs(K,N,H,M)
1. S ← N ‖ 0∗ ‖ 0 ‖ K
2. S ← Absorb(S,H)
3. S ← Absorb(S,M)
4. S ← P (S)
5. S ← S ⊕ |H| ‖ |M |
6. S ← P (S)
7. T ← leftτ (S)
8. return T
Algorithm: MRSDec(K,T,C)
1. M ← ε
2. if |C| > 0 then
3. S ← T ‖ 0∗ ‖ 1 ‖ K
4. C0 ‖ · · · ‖ Cm−1 ← pad0r(C)
5. for i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1} do
6. S ← P (S)
7. M ←M ‖ leftr(S ⊕ (Ci ‖ 0c))
8. S ← Ci ‖ rightc(S)
9. end
10. end
11. return left|C|(M)
Algorithm: MRSD(K,N,H,C, T )
1. M ← MRSDec(K,T,C)
2. T ′ ← MRSAbs(K,N,H,M)
3. if T = T ′ then return M else return ⊥ end
Fig. 5: Misuse-Resistant Sponge (MRS)
6.2 Security of MRS
Theorem 7. Let P $←− Perm(b). Then, in the nonce-reuse setting,
AdvaeMRS,P (qE , qD, σ, p) ≤
4σ2
2b +
4σ2
2c +
2σp
2k +
q2E/2 + qDqE + qD
2τ .
The proof is given in Supporting Material D. It is different from the proofs for
OPP and MRO, although it is also effectively a standard-model proof. It relies
on the observation that both the absorption and the encryption phase are in fact
evaluations of the Full-state Keyed Duplex [11,66]. This construction has been
proven to behave like a random functionality, with the property that it always
outputs uniformly random data, up to common prefix in the input. Assuming
that the distinguisher never makes duplicate queries, MRSAbs never has common
prefixes; assuming tags never collide, MRSEnc never has common prefixes; and
finally, the initial inputs to MRSAbs versus MRSEnc are always different due to
the 0/1 domain separation. The proof then easily follows.
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Fig. 6: Misuse-Resistant Sponge (MRS)
7 Misuse-Resistant Sponge-Offset (MRSO)
The constructions of Sections 5 and 6 can be combined in a straightforward way to
obtain two hybrid constructions: the Misuse-Resistant Sponge-then-Offset Mode
(MRSO) and the Misuse-Resistant Offset-then-Sponge Mode (MROS). While we
cannot think of any practical use-case for MROS, we do think the MRSO hybrid
is useful. As suggested in Section 6, MRSO is comparable with—and in fact
improves over—Haddoc.
7.1 Specification of MRSO
The formal specification of the MRSO AE scheme is formalized in Fig. 7. It
MACs the data using MRSAbs and encrypts using MROEnc. MRSO uses MEM
as specified for OPP but requires only a very limited selection of tweaks and has
i1 = i2 = 0 fixed. Thus, the general masking function can be simplified to
δ : (K,X, i0) 7→ αi0(P (X ‖ K)) .
For the encryption part MROEnc this is clear (cf. Section 5). For the absorption
part MRSAbs, this is less clear: informally, it is based on the idea of setting
L = P (N ‖ 0∗ ‖ K), and of XORing this value everywhere in-between two
consecutive evaluations of P . Because at the end of MRSAbs, a part of the rate
is extracted, this “trick” only works if performed with the rightmost b− τ bits
of L. Therefore, MRSO is based on a slight adjustment of MEM with b− τ -bit
maskings only. The details follow in the security proof (Supporting Material E).
Let h = |H|b and m = |M |b denote the number of b-bit header and message
blocks, respectively. We use the following setup for masking:
MRSAbs MROEnc
data block condition i0 data block condition i0
Hi 0 ≤ i ≤ h− 1 0 Mj 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1 1
Mj 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1 0
|H| ‖ |M | n.a. 0
Algorithm: MRSOE(K,N,H,M)
1. X ← pad0b−n−k(N)
2. T ← MRSAbs(K,N,H,M)
3. C ← MROEnc(K,X, T,M)
4. return C, T
Algorithm: MRSOD(K,N,H,C, T )
1. X ← pad0b−n−k(N)
2. M ← MRODec(K,X, T,C)
3. T ′ ← MRSAbs(K,N,H,M)
4. if T = T ′ then return M else return ⊥ end
Fig. 7: Hybrid Sponge-Offset mode MRSO. Refer to Figs. 3 and 5 for the sub-
algorithms
7.2 Security of MRSO
Theorem 8. Let P $←− Perm(b). Then, in the nonce-reuse setting,
AdvaeMRSO,P (qE , qD, σ, p) ≤
2σ2
2b +
5.5σ2
2b−τ +
3σp
2b−τ +
p
2k +
q2E/2 + qD
2τ .
The proof is similar to the proof of MRO, and is given in Supporting Material E.
8 Implementation
In this section we discuss our results on the implementations of concrete instanti-
ations of OPP, MRO, and MRS. For all three schemes we use state, key, tag, and
nonce sizes of b = 1024, k = τ = 256, and n = 128 bits. For P we employ the
BLAKE2b [6] permutation with l ∈ {4, 6} rounds. For OPP and MRO we use
ϕ(x0, . . . , x15) = (x1, ..., x15, (x0≪ 53)⊕ (x5  13))
and for MRSEnc we set rate and capacity to r = 768 and c = 256 bits.
To remain self-contained, we now define the BLAKE2b permutation. The
permutation operates on a state S = (s0, . . . , s15) with 64-bit words si. A single
round F (S) consists of the sequence of operations
G(s0, s4, s8, s12); G(s1, s5, s9, s13); G(s2, s6, s10, s14); G(s3, s7, s11, s15);
G(s0, s5, s10, s15); G(s1, s6, s11, s12); G(s2, s7, s8, s13); G(s3, s4, s9, s14);
where
G(a, b, c, d) =
{
a = a+ b; d = (d⊕ a)≫ 32; c = c+ d; b = (b⊕ c)≫ 24;
a = a+ b; d = (d⊕ a)≫ 16; c = c+ d; b = (b⊕ c)≫ 63;
BLAKE2 and its predecessors have been heavily analyzed, e.g., [54,41]. These re-
sults are mostly of theoretical interest though since the complexity of the attacks
vastly outweigh our targeted security level. Nevertheless, the BLAKE2 permuta-
tion family has some evident and well-known non-random characteristics [5]: for
any l > 0, it holds that F l(0) = 0 and
F l(a, a, a, a, b, b, b, b, c, c, c, c, d, d, d, d) = (w,w,w,w, x, x, x, x, y, y, y, y, z, z, z, z)
Table 2: Performance of the OPP, MRO, and MRS schemes instantiated with the
BLAKE2b permutation
l = 4 l = 6
Platform Impl. OPP MRO MRS OPP MRO MRS
Cortex-A8 NEON 4.26 8.07 8.50 5.91 11.32 12.21
Sandy Bridge AVX 1.24 2.41 2.55 1.91 3.58 3.87
Haswell AVX2 0.55 1.06 2.40 0.75 1.39 3.58
for arbitrary values a, b, c, and d. With some care in the design phase, these
symmetric states can be easily avoided though, so that an adversary can not
exploit them as a distinguisher. Thus, we use slightly modified variants of the
schemes introduced in Sections 4 to 7. Instead of initializing the masks with
P (N ‖ 0640 ‖ K) in OPP and MRO, we encode the round number l and tag size
τ as 64-bit strings and use P (N ‖ 0512 ‖ 〈l〉64 ‖ 〈τ〉64 ‖ K). Analogously, the
Sponge states in MRSAbs and MRSEnc are initialized with N ‖ 0448 ‖ 〈l〉64 ‖
〈τ〉64 ‖ 〈0〉64 ‖ K and T ‖ 0320 ‖ 〈l〉64 ‖ 〈τ〉64 ‖ 〈1〉64 ‖ K, respectively.
We wrote reference implementations of all schemes in plain C and optimized
variants using the AVX, AVX2, and NEON instruction sets.8Performance was
measured on the Intel Sandy Bridge and Haswell microarchitectures, and on the
ARM Cortex-A8. Tables 2 and 3 list timings of our optimized implementations
and of some reference AEAD schemes, respectively. All values are given for “long
messages” (≥ 4KiB) with cycles per byte (cpb) as unit.
In the nonce-respecting scenario our fastest proposal is OPP with 4 BLAKE2b
rounds. Our 4-fold word-sliced AVX2-implementation achieves 0.55 cpb on Haswell,
which amounts to a throughput of about 6.36GiBps assuming a processor fre-
quency of 3.5GHz. Compared to its competitors AES-GCM, OCB3, ChaCha20-
Poly1305 and Deoxys6= (v1.3), this instantiation of OPP is faster by factors of
about 1.87, 1.25, 3.80, and 3.07 respectively. Even the more conservative 6-round
variant of our scheme is able to maintain high speeds at 0.75 cpb (4.67GiBps)
reducing the distance to the above competitors to factors of 1.37, 0.92, 2.78,
and 2.25. On ARM platforms, without AES-NI instructions, the performance
advantage of OPP is even more significant. There our NEON-implementation out-
performs the AES-based ciphers OCB3 and AES-GCM by factors of about 6.78
and 9.06. The highly hand-optimized Salsa20-Poly1305 implementation of [10] is
somewhat able to keep pace and is only slower by a factor of around 1.92.
In the misuse-resistant scenario our fastest proposal is MRO with 4 BLAKE2b
rounds. Our 4-fold word-sliced AVX2-implementation achieves 1.06 cpb on Haswell
which is equivalent to a throughput of 3.30GiBps at a frequency of 3.5GHz. In
comparison to schemes such as AES-GCM-SIV and Deoxys= (v.1.3), the above
instantiation of MRO is faster by factors of about 1.10 and 3.09. For the 6-round
version with 1.39 cpb these factors are reduced to 0.79 and 2.35, respectively.
Unfortunately, there is not enough published data on performance of misuse-
resistant AE schemes on ARM. As for OPP in the nonce-respecting scenario, one
8 The source code of our schemes is freely available at [64] under a CC0 license.
Table 3: Performance of some reference AEAD modes
nonce-respecting misuse-resistant
Chacha20- Salsa20-
Platform AES-GCM OCB3 Poly1305 Poly1305 Deoxys 6= GCM-SIV Deoxys=
Cortex-A8 38.6 28.9 - 5.60+2.60 - - -
Sandy Bridge 2.55 0.98 - - 1.32 - 2.59
Haswell 1.03 0.69 1.43+0.66 - 1.69 1.17 3.28
References [18,39] [58,39] [31,32] [10] [46] [40] [46]
can expect similar performance gaps between the misuse-resistant AES-based
schemes and MRO. When comparing MRO to Salsa20-Poly1305, which assumes
a nonce-respecting adversary, the two schemes are basically on par.
Due to the inherently sequential Sponge-construction used in MRS, advanced
implementation techniques like 4-fold word-slicing are not possible. It is therefore
no big surprise that MRS performs worse than MRO. Nevertheless, on Haswell
MRS achieves 2.40 cpb (l = 4) and 3.58 cpb (l = 6) which translate to throughputs
of 1.45GiBps and 0.97GiBps, respectively. Thus, MRS is still competitive to
other misuse-resistant AE schemes on Intel platforms. But also on ARM, it
demonstrates good performance almost on the level of MRO. Currently, we have
not written any implementations for MRSO but it is to be expected that its
performance lies somewhere between MRO and MRS.
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Supporting Material
A Proof of Theorem 2 (Security of MEM)
Let K $←− {0, 1}k, P $←− Perm(b), and pi $←− P˜erm(T , b). Consider a deterministic
MTPRP distinguisher D for the tweakable blockcipher E˜ of Section 3.1. By the
security definition of Section 2.2, in the real world it has access to O = (E˜±, P±),
and in the ideal world to P = (pi±, P±). It makes q construction queries, and p
primitive queries to P±.
By hypothesis, the tweak space T is -proper relative to the set of functions
Φ. The distinguisher is expected to obey the masking partition T = T0 ∪ T1 in
such a way that tweaks from T0 are only used in forward direction. We have
(0, . . . , 0) 6∈ T1 i¯ by assumption, meaning that this masking can be used in forward
direction only.
Views. The information that is gathered by D is summarized in a view ν. This
view will consist of a summary of all information D learns during the interaction
with its oracles, as well as some additional information that will be revealed after
the proof.
The construction queries are summarized in a directionless view
ν1 = {(X1, i¯1,M1, C1), . . . , (Xq, i¯q,Mq, Cq)} ,
meaning that the jth construction query was made on input of tweak (Xj , i¯j)
and message Mj , and responded with cipher Cj , or vice versa. Note that we do
not make a distinction between queries with tweak from T0 and T1; the analysis
is identical, with the only exception being i¯j = (0, . . . , 0), in which case we have
to keep in mind that the query is made in forward direction. Let s denote the
number of distinct values Xj , and let {Y1, . . . , Ys} be the minimal set such that
it includes X1, . . . , Xq.
The primitive queries are summarized in a view
ν2 = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xp, yp)} ,
which means that the jth primitive query was either a forward query on input of
xj (with response yj) or vice versa.
As the distinguisher is deterministic, there is a one-to-one mapping between
these directionless views (ν1, ν2) and the interaction of D with its oracles. There-
fore, (ν1, ν2) properly summarizes the conversation.
To simplify our security analysis, we will reveal the keying information
to D at the end of the interaction. This “trick” was employed in earlier H-
coefficient technique based security proofs of Even-Mansour constructions (see,
e.g., [26,23,24]), but because for E˜ the key is first transformed to obtain the
masks, the situation is slightly more technical, and we follow ideas from [65]. In
more detail, we reveal
νK = {(KY1 ,K?Y1), . . . , (KYs ,K?Ys)} .
In the real world, we have KYj = Yj ‖ K and K?Yj = P (Yj ‖ K), where
K
$←− {0, 1}k is the key used for the entire game. In the ideal world, we set
K
$←− {0, 1}k, KYj = Yj ‖ K, and K?Yj
$←− {0, 1}b for j = 1, . . . , s.
Note that the disclosure of νK is without loss of generality: it will only increase
the success probability of D. The total view is denoted
ν = (ν1, ν2, νK) .
We assume that D never makes duplicate queries, and hence ν1 contains no
duplicate elements, and the same for ν2.
Attainable Views and View-Compliant Oracles. Denote by XO the prob-
ability distribution of views when interacting with O, and similarly XP the proba-
bility distribution of views when interacting with P . A view ν is called “attainable”
if it may appear during an interaction with P, or formally if Pr (XP = ν) > 0.
Throughout, we will only focus on attainable views. Concretely, for ν1 this im-
plies that for any j 6= j′ such that (Xj , i¯j) = (Xj′ , i¯j′), we have Mj 6= Mj′ and
Cj 6= Cj′ . For ν2, attainability implies that for all j 6= j′, we have xj 6= xj′ and
yj 6= yj′ .
We say that a tweakable permutation pi ∈ P˜erm(T , b) is compliant with
construction view ν!, denoted pi ` ν1, if pi(X, i¯,M) = C for each (X, i¯,M,C) ∈ ν1.
Similarly, if νP = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xp, yp)} is a primitive view (for instance, νP = ν2
or νP = νK), we say that a permutation P ∈ Perm(b) is compliant with νP ,
denoted P ` νP , if P (x) = y for each (x, y) ∈ νP .
Patarin’s H-Coefficient Technique. Our proof is based on Patarin’s H-
coefficient technique [70]. We will follow the formalism of Chen and Stein-
berger [24].
Lemma 9 (Patarin’s Technique). Let D be a deterministic distinguisher.
Denote by V the set of attainable views, and consider a partition V = Vgood∪Vbad
of V into good and bad views. Let 0 ≤ ε be such that for all ν ∈ Vgood,
Pr (XO = ν)
Pr (XP = ν)
≥ 1− ε . (7)
Then, the distinguishing advantage satisfies ∆D(O;P) ≤ ε+Pr (XP ∈ Vbad).
A proof of this lemma can be found, among others, in [24,23]. At a high level, the
idea of the technique is to identify views for which the fraction of (7) is large, and
to isolate them as being “bad” views. Then, for all “good” views the distributions
XO and XP are relatively close to each other and ε will be small. Note that if
the definition of bad views is too loose, Pr (XP ∈ Vbad) will be large, while if it
is too tight, ε will be larger.
Definition of Bad Views. Note that in the real world, all tuples in ν define
an input/output-tuple for P : for ν2 and νK this is clear, for ν1 this follows from
the definition of E˜. Provided no collision within these tuples occurs, ν defines
exactly q+ p+ s tuples for P . Inspired by this, we will call a transcript bad if any
collision occurs. Formally, ν is called bad if one of the following conditions holds:
bad1,1 : for distinct some (X, i¯,M,C), (X ′, i¯′,M ′, C ′) ∈ ν1:
ϕ
iu−1
u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi00 (K?X)⊕ ϕ
i′u−1
u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi
′
0
0 (K?X′) ∈ {M ⊕M ′, C ⊕ C ′} ,
bad1,2 : for some (X, i¯,M,C) ∈ ν1 and (x, y) ∈ ν2:
ϕ
iu−1
u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi00 (K?X) ∈ {M ⊕ x,C ⊕ y} ,
bad1,K : for some (X, i¯,M,C) ∈ ν1 and (KY ,K?Y ) ∈ νK :
ϕ
iu−1
u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi00 (K?X) ∈ {M ⊕KY , C ⊕K?Y } ,
bad2,K : for some (x, y) ∈ ν2 and (KY ,K?Y ) ∈ νK :
x = KY or y = K?Y ,
badK,K : for distinct some (KY ,K?Y ), (KY ′ ,K?Y ′) ∈ νK :
K?Y = K?Y ′ .
We write bad = bad1,1∨bad1,2∨bad1,K∨bad2,K∨badK,K . Above bad events are
structured as follows: bad1,1 covers both possible collisions (input- and output-)
of tuples within ν1; bad1,2 and bad1,K cover collisions between ν1 on the one
hand and ν2 resp. νK on the other hand. Similarly for bad2,K and badK,K . Note
that, by attainability of views, there are no collisions within ν2, hence there is no
such bad event as bad2,2. Also, note that for badK,K the input values in badK,K
never collide, as they are of the form Y ‖ K and Y ′ ‖ K for Y 6= Y ′.
In the remainder of the proof, we will derive an upper bound on the probability
that a bad view appears in the ideal world, Pr (XP ∈ Vbad), and we will show
that for any good transcript we have Pr (XO = ν) ≥ Pr (XP = ν). This will
immediately complete the proof via Lemma 9.
Probability of Bad View in Ideal World. Our goal is to boundPr (XP ∈ Vbad).
Let ν be any view in the ideal world P = (pi±, P±), and denote by Pr (bad) the
probability that this view satisfies bad. By basic probability theory,
Pr (bad) = Pr (bad1,1 ∨ bad1,2 ∨ bad1,K ∨ bad2,K ∨ badK,K)
≤ Pr (bad1,1) +Pr (bad1,2) +Pr (bad1,K) +Pr (bad2,K) +Pr (badK,K) .
(8)
Recall that by definition of the ideal world, we have K $←− {0, 1}k, KYj = Yj ‖ K,
and K?Yj
$←− {0, 1}b for j = 1, . . . , s. For queries with i¯j = (0, . . . , 0), we will
additionally use that this query is necessarily made in forward direction, which
implies that the value Cj is randomly drawn from a set of size at least 2b − q.
Regarding bad1,1, let (X, i¯,M,C), (X ′, i¯′,M ′, C ′) ∈ ν1 be any two distinct queries.
We make a distinction depending on the values (X, i¯) and (X ′, i¯′):
– If (X, i¯) = (X ′, i¯′), we necessarily have M 6= M ′ and C 6= C ′ by attainability
of transcripts and bad1,1 is set by these two queries with probability 0;
– If X 6= X ′, then K?X and K?X′ are two independently generated random
values and we argue based on the former. The condition of bad1,1 reads:
ϕ
iu−1
u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi00 (K?X) ∈ {M ⊕M ′ ⊕ ϕ
i′u−1
u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi
′
0
0 (K?X′),
C ⊕ C ′ ⊕ ϕi
′
u−1
u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi
′
0
0 (K?X′)} .
As K?X
$←− {0, 1}b, by Definition 1 part 1 this happens with probability at
most 2/2;
– If X = X ′ but i¯ 6= i¯′, then K?X = K?X′ $←− {0, 1}b and Definition 1 part 2
directly shows that the condition is satisfied with probability at most 2/2.
Summing over all possible queries, we obtain Pr (bad1,1) ≤ 2(
q
2)
2 ≤ q
2
2 .
Regarding bad1,2, let (X, i¯,M,C) ∈ ν1 and (x, y) ∈ ν2 by any two queries. Let
(KX ,K?X) ∈ νK be the unique tuple in νK corresponding to the tweak X in the
tuple from ν1. As K?X
$←− {0, 1}b, by Definition 1 part 1 the two queries satisfy
the condition of bad1,2 with probability at most 2/2. Summing over all possible
queries, we obtain Pr (bad1,2) ≤ 2qp2 .
Regarding bad1,K , we divide it into two subcases:
bad1,K : for some (X, i¯,M,C) ∈ ν1 and (KY ,K?Y ) ∈ νK :
(a) ϕiu−1u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi00 (K?X) = M ⊕KY , or
(b) ϕiu−1u−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕi00 (K?X) = C ⊕K?Y .
Let (X, i¯,M,C) ∈ ν1 and (KY ,K?Y ) ∈ νK be any two queries. Let (KX ,K?X) ∈ νK
be the unique tuple in νK corresponding to the tweak X in the tuple from ν1.
For bad1,K(a), because K?X
$←− {0, 1}b is generated independently from KY =
Y ‖ K, by Definition 1 part 1 the condition is satisfied with probability 1/2.
Summing over all possible queries, we obtain Pr (bad1,K(a)) ≤ qs2 .
For bad1,K(b), a technicality is involved if X = Y , and above reasoning does
not directly carry over. Instead, we make a case distinction:
– If X 6= Y , then K?X and K?Y are two independently generated random values
and we argue based on the former. As K?X
$←− {0, 1}b, by Definition 1 part 1
the event happens with probability 1/2;
– If X = Y but i¯ 6= (0, . . . , 0), then K?X = K?Y $←− {0, 1}b and by Definition 1
part 2 the event happens with probability 1/2;
– If X = Y and i¯ = (0, . . . , 0), then the condition reads C = 0. Because masking
i¯ = (0, . . . , 0) can only appear in forward queries, the C-values is uniformly
randomly drawn from a set of size at least 2b − q. The condition is satisfied
with probability at most 1/(2b − q).
Summing over all possible queries, we obtain Pr (bad1,K(b)) ≤ qsmin{2,2b−q} .
Concluding the case of bad1,K , we obtain Pr (bad1,K) ≤ qs2 + qsmin{2,2b−q} .
Regarding bad2,K , we divide it into two subcases:
bad2,K : for some (x, y) ∈ ν2 and (KY ,K?Y ) ∈ νK :
(a) x = KY , or
(b) y = K?Y .
For bad2,K(a), recall that the input values in νK are of the form KY = Y ‖ K.
Therefore, the condition is satisfied only if there is a tuple (x, y) ∈ ν2 such that
rightk(x) = K. Because K
$←− {0, 1}k this happens with probability at most
Pr (bad2,K(a)) ≤ p2k .
For bad2,K(b), let (x, y) ∈ ν2 and (KY ,K?Y ) ∈ νK be any two queries. Because
K?Y
$←− {0, 1}b, the two queries satisfy bad2,K(b) with probability 1/2b. Summing
over all possible queries, we obtain Pr (bad2,K(b)) ≤ ps2b .
Concluding the case of bad2,K , we obtain Pr (bad2,K) ≤ p2k + ps2b .
Regarding badK,K , let (KY ,K?Y ), (KY ′ ,K?Y ′) ∈ νK by any two distinct queries.
K?Y and K?Y ′ are two independently generated random values and the condition
is satisfied with probability 1/2b. Summing over all possible queries, we obtain
Pr (badK,K) ≤ (
s
2)
2b .
To conclude, from (8) we obtain
Pr (XP ∈ Vbad) ≤ q
2
2 +
2qp
2 +
qs
2 +
qs
min{2, 2b − q} +
p
2k +
ps
2b +
(
s
2
)
2b ,
≤ 4.5q
2
2 +
3qp
2 +
p
2k ,
where the simplification is done using s ≤ q and 2b − q ≥ 2b−1 ≥ 2−1.
Probability Ratio for Good Views. We will prove that for any good view
ν, we have Pr (XO = ν) ≥ Pr (XP = ν). It suffices to compute the fraction of
oracles that could result in view ν for both worlds O and P . Recall that D never
makes redundant queries, and that the views are assumed to be attainable and
good. The proof follows [65] almost verbatim, but a few technicalities occur and
we include the proof for completeness.
Regarding the real world, goodness of the view guarantees that (a) every
tuple in ν1 defines exactly one input/output-tuple of P , (b) every tuple in ν2
and νK corresponds to exactly one input/output-tuple of P , and (c) that none
of these tuples collide in the input or the output. Recall that the input values in
νK are of the form Y ‖ K. Therefore we derive:
Pr (XO = ν) = Pr
(
K ′ $←− {0, 1}k : K ′ = K
)
·
Pr
(
P
$←− Perm(b) : E˜ ` ν1 ∧ P ` ν2 ∧ P ` νK
)
= 12k ·
(2b − (q + p+ s))!
2b! .
Regarding the ideal world, we group the elements of ν1 according to the tweak
values. For T ∈ T , define
qT = |{(T,M,C) ∈ ν1 |M,C ∈ {0, 1}b}| ,
where
∑
T qT = q. Now,
Pr (XP = ν) = Pr
(
K ′ $←− {0, 1}k : K ′ = K
)
·
s∏
j=1
Pr
(
K?Yj
′ $←− {0, 1}b : K?Yj ′ = K?Yj
)
·
Pr
(
pi
$←− P˜erm(T , b) : pi ` ν1
)
·
Pr
(
P
$←− Perm(b) : P ` ν2
)
= 12k ·
1
(2b)s ·
∏
T
(2b − qT )!
2b! ·
(2b − p)!
2b! .
Note that 1(2b)s ≤ (2
b−s)!
2b! . Note furthermore that for any α, β ≤ 2b we have
(2b−α)!
2b! · (2
b−β)!
2b! ≤ (2
b−(α+β))!
2b! . We thus get
Pr (XP = ν) ≤ 12k ·
(2b − (q + p+ s))!
2b! = Pr (XO = ν) .
This completes the proof.
B Proof of Theorem 5 (Security of OPP)
Let K $←− {0, 1}k and P $←− Perm(b). LetD be a nonce-respecting AE distinguisher
against OPP, which means that it never makes an encryption query for a nonce
that was used before. For brevity and rigority, write EPK := OPPEK and DPK :=
OPPDK , including an explicit mentioning of the underlying primitive P .
As explained in Section 4, we can identify the tweakable blockcipher E˜ of
Section 3 in OPP. It is used for tweak space T = T0 ∪ T1, where
T0 = {0, 1}b−k × {0, 1, . . . , 21020 − 1} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0} ,
T1 = {0, 1}b−k × {0, 1, . . . , 21020 − 1} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {1} .
We replace E˜ with a random secret tweakable permutation pi $←− P˜erm(T , b), and
find by a hybrid argument:
AdvaeOPP,P (D) = ∆D(EPK ,DPK , P± ; $E ,⊥, P±)
= ∆D(E E˜
P
K
0k ,D
E˜PK
0k , P
± ; $E ,⊥, P±)
≤ ∆D(E p˜i0k ,Dp˜i0k , P± ; $E ,⊥, P±) +∆D1((E˜PK)±, P± ; pi±, P±)
= ∆D(E p˜i0k ,Dp˜i0k , P± ; $E ,⊥, P±) +Advm˜prpE˜,P (D1) ,
where D1 is some MTPRP distinguisher making at most σ construction queries
and at most p queries to P± (in the qE+qD evaluations of E and D, the underlying
E˜ is evaluated at most σ times). By Lemma 4, the masking space T is b-proper,
and by Theorem 2 we obtain
Advm˜prp
E˜,P
(D1) ≤ Advm˜prp
E˜,P
(σ, p) ≤ 4.5σ
2
2b +
3σp
2b +
p
2k .
We proceed with the remaining∆-distance. First note that all construction oracles
are independent of P± and hence we can drop it without loss of generality. Now,
this ∆-distance is in fact the AE security of ΘCB3 of Krovetz and Rogaway [58].
Even though they analyze the privacy and authenticity of ΘCB3 separately, their
bounds directly apply and we obtain
∆D(E p˜i0k ,Dp˜i0k , P± ; $E ,⊥, P±) = ∆D(E p˜i,Dp˜i ; $E ,⊥) ≤
2n−τ
2n−1 .
Concluding, we find that
AdvaeOPP,P (D) ≤
4.5σ2
2b +
3σp
2b +
p
2k +
2n−τ
2n − 1 .
C Proof of Theorem 6 (Security of MRO)
The section is divided as follows. In Supporting Material C.1, we consider pseudo-
random functions based on secret tweakable permutations, and derive a bound on
the security of MROAbs. Similarly, we consider the IV-CPA security of MROEnc
in Supporting Material C.2. The proof of Theorem 6 is then given in Supporting
Material C.3.
C.1 Secret-Primitive Pseudorandom Functions
Let pi $←− P˜erm(T , b) be a tweakable permutation with T of Section 5. Let
F p˜i : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}τ be a keyless MAC function based on pi that processes
a message M of arbitrary length to derive a tag T ∈ {0, 1}τ . (Theoretically,
pi functions as the key to F , but for the sake of presentation it is better to
view F as a keyless function.) Define by $F an idealized version of F , which
returns T $←− {0, 1}τ for every input. We define the pseudorandom function (PRF)
security of F based on secret pi as
AdvprfF (D) = ∆D(F p˜i ; $F ) , (9)
where the probabilities are taken over the random choices of pi and $F . By
AdvprfF (q, σ) we denote the maximum advantage over all distinguishers that
make at most q queries to the construction encryption oracle, of total length at
most σ padded blocks.
Secret-Primitive MROAbs. We will analyze the PRF security of a keyless
variant MROAbs : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}τ based on ideal tweakable
permutation pi $←− P˜erm(T , b), cf. Fig. 8.
pi0,0,0N0∗
H0
pih−1,0,0N0∗
Hh−1
pi0,1,0N0∗
M0
pim−1,1,0N0∗
Mm−1. . . . . .
0b
pi
0,
2,
0
N
0∗
|H| ‖ |M |
T
τ
\
Fig. 8: Keyless MROAbsp˜i based on secret tweakable permutation pi
Lemma 10. Let pi $←− P˜erm(T , b) and consider MROAbsp˜i of Fig. 8. Then,
AdvprfMROAbs(q, σ) ≤ σ
2
2b .
Proof. Note that every different nonce sets an independent instance of MROAbsp˜i,
as pi is a random tweakable permutation. For N ∈ {0, 1}n, denote by σN the
total complexity made for nonce N .
Consider MROAbsp˜i(N, ·, ·) for any fixed nonce N . Theorem 15 of the full
version of [71] shows that it is indistinguishable from $F (N, ·, ·) up to σ
2
N
2b . Sum-
mation over all nonces gives
∑
N∈{0,1}n
σ2N
2b ≤ σ
2
2b . uunionsq
C.2 Secret-Primitive Encryption Schemes
Let pi $←− P˜erm(T , b) be a tweakable permutation with T of Section 5. Let
E p˜i : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}τ×{0, 1}∗ be a keyless initial value based encryption
scheme based on pi that processes a message M of arbitrary length as follows:
it selects a random initial value IV $←− {0, 1}τ and uses it to derive a ciphertext
C ∈ {0, 1}|M |. It is required to be invertible for fixed IV and nonce N , and its
inverse is denoted by (E p˜i)−1(IV , N, ·). Define by $E an idealized version of E ,
which returns IV ‖ C $←− {0, 1}τ+|M | for every input. Following, Namprempre et
al. [68], we define the IV-based chosen plaintext attack (IV-CPA) security of E
based on P as
Adviv-cpaE (D) = ∆D(E p˜i ; $E) , (10)
where the probabilities are taken over the random choices of E , pi and $E . By
Adviv-cpaE (q, σ) we denote the maximum advantage over all distinguishers that
make at most q queries to the construction encryption oracle, of total length at
most σ padded blocks.
Secret-Primitive MROEnc. We will analyze the IV-CPA security of a keyless
variant MROEnc : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}τ → {0, 1}∗ based on ideal tweakable
permutation pi $←− P˜erm(T , b), cf. Fig. 9. It is required to be given a random
T
$←− {0, 1}τ (included as explicit parameter to MROEnc for simplicity), which
operates as the IV , and produces a ciphertext on input of a nonce and a message.
Note that MROEnc only uses pi for tweaks of the form (N, 0, 0, 1), but generality
is maintained to suit the analysis.
pi0,0,1N0∗
T ‖ 0
C0
M0
pi0,0,1N0∗
T ‖ m− 1
Cm−1
Mm−1
. . .
Fig. 9: Keyless MROEncp˜i based on secret tweakable permutation pi
Lemma 11. Let pi $←− P˜erm(T , b) and consider MROEncp˜i of Fig. 9. Then,
Adviv-cpaMROEnc(q, σ) ≤ σ
2
2b +
q2
2τ+1 .
Proof. Note that every different nonce sets an independent instance of MROEncp˜i,
as pi is a random tweakable permutation. For N ∈ {0, 1}n, denote by qN the
total number of queries and by σN the total complexity made for nonce N .
Consider MROEncp˜i(N, ·, ·) for any fixed nonce N . It reminds of XOR$ from
Bellare et al. [9] with two differences: (i) XOR$ uses a random function while
MROEnc uses a permutation pi0,0,1N0∗ , and (ii) XOR$ inputs T +ctr to the primitive
while MROEnc inputs T ‖ ctr. The proof nevertheless mostly carries over. As a
first step, we replace pi0,0,1N0∗ by a random function $F : {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b. This
step costs us at most σ
2
N
2b by the RP/RF-switch. Note that every new initial value
sets an independent instance of MROEnc$F , as $F is a random function. Denote
the q initial values by T1, . . . , Tq. Clearly, MROEnc$F behaves like a random $E
as long as Ti 6= Tj . A collision in the T ’s happens with probability at most q
2
2τ+1 ,
due to our condition that the T ’s are uniformly randomly generated from {0, 1}τ .
Concluding,MROEncp˜i(N, ·, ·) is indistinguishable from $E(N, ·, ·) up to σ
2
N
2b +
q2N
2τ+1 .
Summation over all nonces gives
∑
N∈{0,1}n
σ2N
2b +
q2N
2τ+1 ≤ σ
2
2b +
q2
2τ+1 . uunionsq
C.3 Proof of Theorem 6
Let K $←− {0, 1}k and P $←− Perm(b). Let D be a nonce-misusing AE dis-
tinguisher against MRO. For rigority, write E [AbsPK ,EncPK ] := MROEK and
D[AbsPK ,DecPK ] := MRODK , including an explicit mentioning of the underly-
ing primitive P .
As explained in Section 5, we can identify the tweakable blockcipher E˜ of
Section 3 in MRO. It is used for tweak space
T = T0 = {0, 1}b−k × {0, 1, . . . , 21020 − 1} × {0, 1, 2} × {0, 1} .
We replace E˜ with a random secret tweakable permutation pi $←− P˜erm(T , b), and
find by a hybrid argument:
AdvaeMRO,P (D) = ∆D(E [AbsPK ,EncPK ],D[AbsPK ,DecPK ], P± ; $E ,⊥, P±)
≤ ∆D(E [Absp˜i,Encp˜i],D[Absp˜i,Decp˜i], P± ; $E ,⊥, P±) +
∆D1(E˜PK , P± ; pi, P±)
= ∆D(E [Absp˜i,Encp˜i],D[Absp˜i,Decp˜i], P± ; $E ,⊥, P±) +
Advm˜prp
E˜,P
(D1) ,
where Absp˜i is the keyless PRF of Fig. 8 and Encp˜i the encryption scheme of Fig. 9
(with Decp˜i its corresponding decryption function), and whereD1 is some MTPRP
distinguisher making at most σ construction queries and at most p queries to P±
(in the qE + qD evaluations of E and D, the underlying E˜ is evaluated at most σ
times). By Lemma 4, the masking space T is b-proper, and Theorem 2 applies.
We proceed with the remaining ∆-distance. As before, the construction
oracles are independent of P± and we can drop it without loss of generality. Let
pi′ $←− P˜erm(T , b). Then,
∆D(E [Absp˜i,Encp˜i],D[Absp˜i,Decp˜i], P± ; $E ,⊥, P±)
= ∆D(E [Absp˜i,Encp˜i],D[Absp˜i,Decp˜i] ; $E ,⊥)
= ∆D(E [Absp˜i,Encp˜i
′
],D[Absp˜i,Decp˜i′ ] ; $E ,⊥) ,
as Abs and Enc/Dec evaluate pi on different tweaks.
Above reduction allows to view the absorption and encryption to be indepen-
dently keyed (via pi and pi′). This paves the path for the use of a separation of
AE security into PRF security of Abs and IV-CPA security of Enc, as inspired by
the MAC-then-Encrypt approach of Namprempre et al. [68] and its adaption to
misuse resistance as presented by Gueron and Lindell [40]. For completeness, we
re-derive it for our current setting. We have
∆D(E [Absp˜i,Encp˜i
′
],D[Absp˜i,Decp˜i′ ] ; $E ,⊥)
≤ ∆D(E [Absp˜i,Encp˜i
′
],D[Absp˜i,Decp˜i′ ] ; E [$F ,Encp˜i
′
],D[$F ,Decp˜i
′
]) +
∆D(E [$F ,Encp˜i
′
],D[$F ,Decp˜i
′
] ; $E ,⊥)
≤ AdvprfAbs(D2) +∆D(E [$F ,Encp˜i
′
],D[$F ,Decp˜i
′
] ; $E ,⊥) ,
where D2 is some PRF distinguisher making at most qE + qD queries to the
construction encryption oracle, of total length at most σ blocks. Regarding the
remaining distance:
∆D(E [$F ,Encp˜i
′
],D[$F ,Decp˜i
′
] ; $E ,⊥)
≤ ∆D(E [$F ,Encp˜i
′
],D[$F ,Decp˜i
′
] ; E [$F ,Encp˜i
′
],⊥) +∆D(E [$F ,Encp˜i
′
],⊥ ; $E ,⊥)
≤ ∆D(E [$F ,Encp˜i
′
],D[$F ,Decp˜i
′
] ; E [$F ,Encp˜i
′
],⊥) +Adviv-cpaEnc (D3) ,
where D3 is some IV-CPA distinguisher making at most qE queries to the
construction encryption oracle, of total length at most σ blocks. The remaining
distance boils down to forging a tag for a random $F , in which D succeeds with
probability at most qD2τ . Concluding, we find that
AdvaeMRO,P (D) ≤ Advm˜prpE˜,P (D1) +Adv
prf
Abs(D2) +Adv
iv-cpa
Enc (D3) +
qD
2τ ,
≤ Advm˜prp
E˜,P
(σ, p) +AdvprfAbs(qE + qD, σ) +Adv
iv-cpa
Enc (qE , σ) +
qD
2τ .
A bound on the first term follows from Theorem 2 and the b-properness of the
masking. The second two advantages are bounded using Lemmas 10 and 11.
D Proof of Theorem 7 (Security of MRS)
The proof is structurally different from the one of OPP and MRO, and particular
does not rely on MEM. The remainder of this section is as follows. In Supporting
Material D.1, we present a (normal) blockcipher underlying MRS. Then, in
Supporting Material D.2 we discuss the Duplex construction. The proof is given
in Supporting Material D.3.
D.1 Blockcipher Construction
Let P $←− Perm(b) and write b = c + r. Define the following blockcipher E˜MRS :
{0, 1}k × {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b:
E˜MRS(K,M) = P ((0b−k ‖ K)⊕M)⊕ (0b−k ‖ K) .
Note that this is a tweakable blockcipher with empty tweak space, T = ∅, and the
model of Section 2 carries over. We will explain how this blockcipher appears in
MRS. Note that in MRSAbs, the state is initialized with 0b−k ‖ K. The trick will
be to XOR this value everywhere in-between two consecutive evaluations of P , in
a similar fashion as done in [22,4,66]. As k ≤ c, this adjustment is artificial and it
does not change the scheme. In this case, MRSAbs is effectively just compressing
its blocks one by one, interleaved with an evaluation of E˜MRS(K, ·). The situation
for MRSEnc is identical.
Lemma 12. Let P $←− Perm(b). Then, Advp˜rp
E˜MRS,P
(q, p) ≤ 2qp2k .
Proof. The proof is a straightforward adaption of Theorem 2 of [4] to k-bit keys.
See also [66]. uunionsq
D.2 Secret-Primitive Full-State Duplex
Bertoni et al. [11] introduced the Duplex construction, and Mennink et al. [66]
generalized it to the full-state Duplex. At a high level, the full-state Duplex
consists of two interfaces. Duplex.init gets as input a key K ∈ {0, 1}k, initializes
the state as 0b−k ‖ K, and outputs nothing. Duplex.dup gets as input a message
block M ∈ {0, 1}b and a natural number z ≤ r, transforms the state using M ,
and outputs a string Z ∈ {0, 1}z.9 We will consider a keyless variant of Duplex
based on secret permutation pi $←− {0, 1}b of Fig. 10. Theoretically, pi functions as
the key to Duplex.
Mennink et al. proved that this secret-primitive Duplex behaves like a random
functionality up to common prefix. Define by $∞ : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∞ a random
function that takes inputs of arbitrary length and returns random infinite strings,
where each bit is randomly drawn. Define by $dup a stateful random function
with two interfaces: $dup.init gets no input and initializes its state St to the empty
string; $dup.dup gets as input a messageM ∈ {0, 1}b and a natural number z ≤ r,
updates the state as S‖M , and outputs leftz($∞(S)). Note that if $dup is never
queried in such a way that it calls $∞ twice on the same S, it always responds
with random strings. For brevity and applicability later on, define the Duplex
(DUP) security of Duplex based on secret pi as
AdvdupDuplex(D) = ∆D(Duplex
pi ; $dup) , (11)
9 In fact, the classical Duplex is slightly different as it takes message blocksM ∈ {0, 1}<b
and performs 10∗-padding on these blocks. We will use the Duplex as primitive in
another mode, and the padding requirements are handled by the mode that is placed
on top of Duplex. The results of [66] carry over.
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Fig. 10: Keyless Duplexpi based on secret permutation pi
where the probabilities are taken over the random choices of pi and $dup. By
AdvdupDuplex(q, σ) we denote the maximum advantage over all distinguishers that
make at most q queries to the construction encryption oracle, of total length at
most σ padded blocks. Translated to counting over total complexity σ (instead
of over λ blocks per query), Mennink et al. [66] proved that Duplex behaves like
$dup.
Lemma 13 (Mennink et al. [66]). Let pi $←− Perm(b) and consider Duplexpi of
Fig. 10. Then, AdvdupDuplex(q, σ) ≤ σ
2
2b +
σ2
2c .
We remark that the main result of [66] is the security of Duplex in the public
permutation setting, which effectively combines Lemmas 12 and 13. We have
separated the results to suit later analysis.
D.3 Proof of Theorem 7
Let K $←− {0, 1}k and P $←− Perm(b). Let D be an AE distinguisher against MRS.
For brevity and rigority, write EPK := MRSEK and DPK := MRSDK , including an
explicit mentioning of the underlying primitive P . By a hybrid argument, we
can identify the blockcipher E˜MRS in MRS and replace it with a random secret
permutation pi $←− Perm(b):
AdvaeMRS,P (D) = ∆D(EPK ,DPK , P± ; $E ,⊥, P±)
= ∆D(E E˜
P
MRS,K
0k ,D
E˜PMRS,K
0k , P
± ; $E ,⊥, P±)
≤ ∆D(Epi0k ,Dpi0k , P± ; $E ,⊥, P±) +∆D1(E˜PMRS,K , P± ; pi, P±)
= ∆D(Epi0k ,Dpi0k , P± ; $E ,⊥, P±) +Advp˜rpE˜MRS,P (D1) ,
where D1 is some TPRP distinguisher making at most σ construction queries and
at most p queries to P± (in the qE + qD evaluations of E and D, the underlying
E˜ is evaluated at most σ times).
We proceed with the remaining ∆-distance. First, for simplicity, we drop the
explicit keying of 0k for convenience. Second, note that all construction oracles
are independent of P± and hence we can drop it without loss of generality. Third,
note that Epi and Dpi are in fact equivalent to E ′[Duplexpi] and D′[Duplexpi] defined
as follows:
Algorithm: Absorb(A)
1. if |A| > 0 then
2. A0 ‖ · · · ‖ Aa−1 ← pad0b(A)
3. for i ∈ {0, . . . , a− 1} do
4. Duplexpi.dup(Ai, 0)
5. end
6. end
7. return S
Algorithm: Enc[Duplexpi](T,M)
1. C ← ε
2. if |M | > 0 then
3. Duplexpi.init()
4. M−1 ← T ‖ 0∗ ‖ 1 ‖ 0k
5. M0 ‖ · · · ‖Mm−1 ← pad0r(M)
6. for i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1} do
7. S ← Duplexpi.dup(Mi−1, r)
8. Ci ← S ⊕Mi
9. C ← C ‖ Ci
10. end
11. end
12. return left|M |(C)
Algorithm: E ′[Duplexpi](N,H,M)
1. T ← Abs[Duplexpi](N,H,M)
2. C ← Enc[Duplexpi](T,M)
3. return C, T
Algorithm: Abs[Duplexpi](N,H,M)
1. Duplexpi.init()
2. Duplexpi.dup(N ‖ 0∗ ‖ 0 ‖ 0k, 0)
3. Absorb(H)
4. Absorb(M)
5. S ← Duplexpi.dup(|H| ‖ |M |, τ)
6. return S
Algorithm: Dec[Duplexpi](T,C)
1. M ← ε
2. if |C| > 0 then
3. Duplexpi.init()
4. M−1 ← T ‖ 0∗ ‖ 1 ‖ 0k
5. C0 ‖ · · · ‖ Cm−1 ← pad0r(C)
6. for i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1} do
7. S ← Duplexpi.dup(Mi−1, r)
8. Mi ← S ⊕ Ci
9. M ←M ‖Mi
10. end
11. end
12. return left|C|(M)
Algorithm: D′[Duplexpi](N,H,C, T )
1. M ← Dec[Duplexpi](T,C)
2. T ′ ← Abs[Duplexpi](N,H,M)
3. if T = T ′ then return M else return ⊥ end
We find,
∆D(Epi0k ,Dpi0k , P± ; $E ,⊥, P±)
= ∆D(Epi,Dpi ; $E ,⊥)
= ∆D(E ′[Duplexpi],D′[Duplexpi] ; $E ,⊥)
≤ ∆D(E ′[$dup],D′[$dup] ; $E ,⊥) +∆D2(Duplexpi ; $dup)
= ∆D(E ′[$dup],D′[$dup] ; $E ,⊥) +AdvdupDuplex(D2) ,
where D2 is some DUP distinguisher making at most 2(qE + qD) queries of total
length at most 2σ blocks.
The remaining ∆-distance is bounded by looking at the calls to E ′[$dup] and
D′[$dup] separately, and relies on the fact that $dup never calls $∞ on the same
state (cf. Supporting Material D.2). An important observation here is that all
calls to $∞ via Abs[$dup] start with first block N ‖ 0∗ ‖ 0 ‖ 0k while all calls to
$∞ via Enc[$dup] and Dec[$dup] start with first block T ‖ 0∗ ‖ 1 ‖ 0k. Hence, the
absorption and encryption/decryption can be seen independently.
– Consider an encryption query E ′[$dup](N,H,M). The call Abs[$dup] triggers
a call to the underlying $∞ on input(
N ‖ 0∗ ‖ 0 ‖ 0k) ‖ padb(H) ‖ padb(M) ‖ (|H| ‖ |M |) .
As D never repeats queries, this means that $∞ has never been queried on
this input and the response is T $←− {0, 1}τ . The call Enc[$dup] triggers calls
to the underlying $∞ on inputs(
T ‖ 0∗ ‖ 1 ‖ 0k) ,(
T ‖ 0∗ ‖ 1 ‖ 0k) ‖M0 ,
...(
T ‖ 0∗ ‖ 1 ‖ 0k) ‖M0 ‖ · · · ‖Mm−1 ,
where M0 ‖ · · · ‖ Mm−1 ← padr(M). Unless if T is an old tag, these calls
to $∞ are new and responded randomly, and we have C
$←− {0, 1}|M |. If T is
an old tag (either from an old encryption or an old decryption query), we
cannot guarantee randomness of C, and this will be viewed as a bad event;
– Consider a decryption queryD′[$dup](N,H,C, T ). DenoteM = Dec[$dup](T,C).
If there is an older query of the form (N,H,M, T ∗), then necessarily T 6= T ∗
(because D never repeats queries) and the forgery cannot be successful. On
the other hand, if there is no older query of the form (N,H,M, T ∗) for any
T ∗, this means that the call to $∞ made via Abs[$dup] is new (the argument
is as for the case of E ′[$dup]) and responded with a random tag T ∗. It equals
T with probability 1/2τ .
If we sum over all queries, we obtain that (E ′[$dup],D′[$dup]) is perfectly indis-
tinguishable from ($E ,⊥), except with probability q
2
E/2+qDqE
2τ +
qD
2τ . Concluding,
we find that
AdvaeMRS,P (D) ≤ Advp˜rpE˜MRS,P (D1) +Adv
dup
Duplex(D2) +
q2E/2 + qDqE + qD
2τ ,
≤ Advp˜rp
E˜MRS,P
(σ, p) +AdvdupDuplex(2(qE + qD), 2σ) +
q2E/2 + qDqE + qD
2τ .
The proof is completed using Lemmas 12 and 13.
E Proof of Theorem 8 (Security of MRSO)
The proof is fairly similar to the one of MRO (Supporting Material C), the only
major difference is in the use of a different tweakable blockcipher. In Supporting
Material E.1 we identify the tweakable blockcipher used in MRSO. Then, in
Section we consider the PRF security of MRSAbs. The proof of Theorem 8 is
then given in Supporting Material E.3
E.1 Tweakable Blockcipher Constructions
It is already mentioned in Section 7 that a slightly different masking is employed.
More detailed, the tweak space is
T = T0 = {0, 1}b−k × {0, 1} ,
and the masking is
δ : (K,X, i) 7→ 0τ ‖ rightb−τ
(
ϕi(P (X ‖ K))) .
We briefly elaborate on the appearance of E˜MRSO in MRSO. At a high level, the
trick for MRSAbs is to start considering appearances of E˜MRSO from the second
permutation (unlike the first as done in Supporting Material D). This would
work well if the value P (N ‖ 0∗ ‖ 0 ‖ K) is XORed twice everywhere in-between
two permutation calls, but because at the end of MRSAbs the leftmost τ bits of
the state are extracted, this is impossible. However, it is clear that by XORing
only the rightmost b− τ bits into the state everywhere, this will only decrease
the security of MRSAbs, and the artificial XORings do not alter the scheme. For
MROEnc on the other hand, the change to only XORing the rightmost b− τ bits
is for simplicity of analysis.
It is trivial to see that the masking is (b − τ)-proper in accordance with
Definition 1, and Theorem 2 applies.
E.2 Secret-Primitive Pseudorandom Functions MRSAbs
We will analyze the PRF security (cf. Supporting Material C.1) of a keyless
variant MRSAbs : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}τ based on ideal tweakable
permutation pi $←− P˜erm(T , b). In more detail, we consider MRSAbsp˜i of Fig. 11.
Note that MRSAbs in MRSO only uses pi for tweaks of the form (N0∗, 0), but we
maintain generality to suit the remainder of the proof.
0 \
b
pi
0 N
0∗
pi
0 N
0∗
pi
0 N
0∗
pi
0 N
0∗
pi
0 N
0∗
H0 Hh−1 M0 Mm−1 |H| ‖ |M |
T\
τ
Fig. 11: Keyless MRSAbsp˜i based on secret tweakable permutation pi
Lemma 14. Let pi $←− P˜erm(T , b) and consider MRSAbsp˜i of Fig. 11. Then,
AdvprfMRSAbs(q, σ) ≤ σ
2
2b +
σ2
2b−τ .
Proof. Note that every different nonce sets an independent instance of MRSAbsp˜i,
as pi is a random tweakable permutation. For N ∈ {0, 1}n, denote by σN the
total complexity made for nonce N .
Consider MRSAbsp˜i(N, ·, ·) for any fixed nonce N . This function is in fact
equivalent to Duplexpi of Fig. 10 in the way as discussed in Supporting Ma-
terial D.3, with c = b − τ . As a first step, we replace Duplexpi with $dup. By
Lemma 13, this step costs at most σ
2
N
2b +
σ2N
2b−τ . Because the distinguisher never
makes repeat queries every call to $∞ triggered by $dup is made with a different
state S, and the output is indistinguishable from $F . Summation over all nonces
gives
∑
N∈{0,1}n
σ2N
2b +
σ2N
2b−τ ≤ σ
2
2b +
σ2
2b−τ . uunionsq
E.3 Proof of Theorem 8
The proof is equivalent to the one of Theorem 6 of Supporting Material C.3,
with the difference that now we use Lemma 14 instead of Lemma 10, and we
use the tweakable cipher of Supporting Material E.1, whose masking is only
(b− τ)-proper.
